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7 
1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
 
“Initially, it was all about increasing the share of renewables. Now 
we’ve got to look at the system as a whole and keep an eye on costs—
renewables have to take on greater responsibility.” 
 
 Brigitte Zypries, Economy Minister of Germany (CEW, 2017) 
 
The increasing share of renewable energy sources (RES) in the energy mix of Germany 
that Brigitte Zypries refers to is supported by the Renewable Energy Act (REA). 
Introduced in 2000, the REA fosters the integration of renewable energies into a 
competitive energy market. To this end, producers of electricity from RES receive 
guaranteed subsidies that are paid by the consumers via a REA-levy. After the 
Fukushima Daiichi nuclear accident in 2011, the German government decided on a 
stepwise nuclear phase-out by 2022 as a part of the so-called “energy transition.” As a 
consequence, nuclear production capacities have to be replaced to guarantee security 
of supply. To fulfill national climate protection goals, which require a target share of 
renewable energies in domestic energy consumption of 30% in 2020 and 50% in 2050, 
the majority of these missing capacities has to be replaced with RES (von 
Hirschhausen, 2014).  
At the end of 2016, the total installed power plant capacity in Germany was about 197 
gigawatts (GW). Approximately 52% of these availabilities stem from RES (103 GW). 
Among them, the potential capacity of wind energy (onshore and offshore) is about 50 
GW and is about 41 GW for solar energy. The remaining installed nuclear power plants 
account for 11% of the total availability (Fraunhofer ISE, 2018).  
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Figure 1-1 depicts the distribution of generated electricity across the different energy 
sources for the years 2006 to 2016. In 2006, RES contributed about 11% to the gross 
electricity generation in Germany. Ten years later, RES account for nearly 30% of the 
total generation of 651 terawatt hours (TWh). Obviously, their share on actual 
generation differs from their share on installed capacities because the actual output 
from RES is very sensitive to changes in weather. 
 
Figure 1-1: Gross electricity generation in Germany from 2006 to 2016 
Source: Statista (2018), modified 
Besides the growth in installed capacities of RES, the process of European energy 
market liberalization led to an increase in trading activities on electricity spot markets. 
The unbundling of generation and sales departments incentivized electricity firms to 
participate in power exchanges to get higher profits (Hagemann, 2015a). 
This dissertation focuses on pricing and risk premia in electricity markets and 
addresses three specific topics related to the German market zone. The first two studies 
investigate research questions related to the German day-ahead electricity market, 
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whereas the third study focuses on the intraday electricity market. To this end, this 
thesis applies econometric methods to get better insight into price building on 
wholesale markets. 
Since the beginning of 2010, electricity generated under the REA in Germany has to 
be traded on power exchanges. As a result, the supply of RES significantly influences 
the price formation. The response of consumers to changes in prices is especially 
important for taxation policies. So far, a price elasticity of electricity demand in 
Germany is only reported for the residential or total electricity demand (Lee and Lee, 
2010; Schulte and Heindl, 2017). Corresponding estimates for power exchanges are 
examined for the Californian, the Norwegian and the Dutch day-ahead electricity 
markets (Earle, 2000; Johnsen, 2001; Lijesen, 2007). Hence, the first research question 
to be answered in this thesis is: 
What is the price elasticity of demand in the German day-ahead electricity 
market?  
Replication is important for reliability and confidence in research findings (Reed and 
Alm, 2015). Chang and Li (2015) report that only half of the research published in 13 
highly ranked economics journals can be replicated. A replication may, therefore, ask 
whether the old results hold if newer data are added and/or methods are brought up to 
date (Clemens, 2015). The second empirical study of this dissertation contributes to 
the literature as a replication study on energy economics. 
Since electricity cannot be stored economically, risk management plays an important 
role for producers and retailers. Because of price and/or demand risks, a risk premium, 
defined as the difference between the forward price and the expected spot price, is 
often observed in short-term electricity markets (Bessembinder and Lemmon, 2002; 
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Redl et al., 2009). Viehmann (2011) empirically examined the presence of risk premia 
in the German day-ahead market, confirming that risk premia are paid in periods of 
low demand and positive risk premia are paid during peak hours.  
The second empirical study in this dissertation replicates the study by Viehmann 
(2011). Besides the replication, it makes the following contributions to the literature. 
First, it extends the original analysis with data of preceding years. Second, it 
investigates the impact of the introduction of negative electricity prices on risk premia. 
Negative price bids for the German market were first introduced in September 2008 at 
the German day-ahead market. Hence, the second research question to be answered in 
this thesis is:  
Does the German day-ahead electricity market exhibit risk premia? What is 
the impact of negative electricity prices on risk premia? 
Given the complexity of electricity markets, prices can depend on other factors than 
market fundamentals such as changes in supply and demand. Asymmetric information 
between participants in electricity markets may distort the formation of a competitive 
price, too (von der Fehr, 2013). The role of private information is investigated in 
studies for the German day-ahead market, in which participants have an incentive to 
withhold capacities to increase the market price (Weigt and von Hirschhausen, 2008; 
Bergler et al., 2017). Variations of the subsequent German intraday price from the day-
ahead price, however, are only analyzed from a fundamental perspective (Hagemann, 
2015b; Pape et al., 2016). Hence, the third research question to be answered in this 
thesis is: 
What is the impact of private and public information about unplanned power 
plant outages on German intraday electricity prices?  
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The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows. Chapter 2 provides an 
introduction to the German electricity market. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are empirical studies 
related to the German day-ahead and intraday markets and can be read as autonomous 
papers. The main ﬁndings, possible policy options, study limitations and future 
research avenues are presented in Chapter 6. 
1.2 Overview 
In the following, I give a brief summary of the studies discussed in this dissertation. 
Every chapter can be read as an autonomous paper and is related to the German 
electricity market. I wrote Chapter 2 and Chapter 4, whereas Chapter 3 is an extension 
of a co-authored paper. Chapter 5 is based on a co-authored paper, too. 
Chapter 2: Introduction to the German electricity market 
Chapter 2 provides an introduction to the German electricity market. It follows the 
structure by Graeber (2014) and discusses the technical background of electricity 
trading and gives an overview of the price building mechanism on wholesale markets. 
The chapter introduces the framework of the German day-ahead and intraday markets, 
which is important for the studies investigated in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, respectively.  
Furthermore, this chapter discusses the model by Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002), 
which is the standard theoretical model to explain the formation of risk premia in 
electricity markets and gives an overview of related empirical studies for German 
markets. Chapter 4 empirically analyzes the impact of negative electricity prices on 
risk premia in the German day-ahead market. 
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Chapter 3: Price elasticity of demand in the German day-ahead electricity market 
Chapter 3 is based on a short paper titled “Price elasticity of demand in the EPEX spot 
market for electricity—New empirical evidence,” co-authored with Prof. Dr. Werner 
Bönte, Dr. Sebastian Nielen and Dr. Torben Engelmeyer, and published in Economics 
Letters (2015, Vol. 135, pp. 5-8).1  
This paper estimates the price elasticity of demand in the European Power Exchange 
(EPEX) day-ahead market for electricity in Germany. It argues that an institutional 
change in the year 2010 enables use of average hourly wind speed as an instrumental 
variable for hourly spot market prices to deal with potential endogeneity problems. 
The average price elasticity of demand covering the years 2010 to 2014 is about –0.43, 
and the results point to a decline in its absolute value over time.  
Using volumes traded on the day-ahead market instead of load implies that the 
estimates do not represent the price elasticity of total electricity demand, but rather the 
price elasticity of demand in the day-ahead market. Future research might use the 
calculated elasticities to investigate market power in the German day-ahead market 
(Borenstein et al., 1999). 
  
                                                 
1 Available here: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2015.07.007.  
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 14th IAEE European Energy Conference in Rome. 
The authors are grateful for participants’ comments and for the helpful suggestions of one anonymous 
referee from Economics Letters. 
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Chapter 4: Risk premia in the German day-ahead electricity market revisited: 
The impact of negative prices 
Chapter 4 is based on a paper titled “Risk premia in the German day-ahead electricity 
market revisited: The impact of negative prices,” published in Energy Economics 
(2018) as a part of the special issue on “Replication in Energy Economics.”2 
This paper replicates Viehmann's (2011) study that investigated risk premia in the 
German day-ahead electricity market from October 2005 to September 2008. While 
estimated sizes of risk premia can be replicated, this paper does not reproduce 
respective standard errors, leading to remarkable differences between the reported 
significance levels. An extension with data of preceding years points to further 
differences with respect to size and statistical significance. In addition, this paper 
analyzes the impact of negative prices on risk premia. Negative electricity prices were 
introduced in 2008 at the EPEX and in 2013 at the Energy Exchange Austria (EXAA). 
The results of an econometric analysis suggest that the introduction of negative prices 
has led to a decrease in risk premia compared to the period of a positive price regime.  
While Viehmann (2011) conjectured that this might be the case, he was unable to 
empirically test this because the analysis was based on data comprised of only positive 
prices. These new results also have implications for theoretical research because 
Bessembinder and Lemmon's (2002) model does not consider the existence of negative 
prices.  
 
                                                 
2 Available here: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.eneco.2018.01.020. 
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 39th IAEE International Conference in Bergen and 
the 11th BIEE Research Conference in Oxford. The author is grateful for participants’ comments and 
for the helpful suggestions of three anonymous referees from Energy Economics. 
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Chapter 5: Asymmetric information in the German intraday electricity market 
Chapter 5 is based on a paper titled “Asymmetric information in the German intraday 
electricity market,” co-authored with Andreas Maier. This paper is currently under 
review in Energy Economics (revise and resubmit).3 
This paper investigates how private and public information about unplanned power 
plant outages impact intraday electricity prices in Germany. It uses data from the 
EPEX day-ahead and continuous intraday markets as well as market messages 
concerning unscheduled power plant non-usabilities from the European Energy 
Exchange (EEX) transparency platform. The results of an econometric analysis 
suggest that private and public information about unplanned power plant outages have 
a significant positive effect on the intraday price.  
Furthermore, this paper shows that a reduction of the lead time on the intraday market 
enhances the possibilities of traders reacting to unplanned non-usabilities: an increased 
impact of private information on the electricity price is observed. The results also 
confirm an asymmetric impact of private and public information on the intraday price 
after the lead time reduction on the power exchange. The findings contradict the main 
objectives of the Regulation on Wholesale Energy Market Integrity and Transparency 
(REMIT), which stipulates that the possession of private information must not have an 
impact on electricity prices. 
 
  
                                                 
3 Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Young Energy Economists and Engineers Seminar 
2017 in Nuremberg, the 40th IAEE International Conference in Singapore and the 36th USAEE/IAEE 
North American Conference in Washington, D.C. The authors are grateful for participants’ comments 
and for the helpful suggestions of two anonymous referees from Energy Economics. An earlier version 
of this paper was awarded a student cash prize ($500) at the 36th USAEE/IAEE North American 
Conference. 
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2 Introduction to the German electricity market 
This chapter introduces the German electricity market to build the theoretical 
framework for the thesis. It describes the technical background of electricity trading 
as well as the principles of price building. Furthermore, the functioning and 
interdependencies between the forward, day-ahead and intraday markets are discussed. 
Finally, this chapter provides an introduction to the theory of risk premia in electricity 
markets and an overview of empirical studies for Germany. 
2.1 Technical background 
Electricity as a commodity has special properties such as immateriality, homogeneity 
and non-storability. In addition, the transport of electricity is network-linked. In 
Germany, the four transmission system operators (TSO), 50Hertz, Amprion, TenneT 
and TransnetBW, are responsible for the reliable functioning of the power grid within 
their control area and for balancing electricity transactions between market participants 
(NEP, 2015).  
 
Figure 2-1: Control areas in Germany 
Source: NEP (2015) 
16 
Due to the homogenous character of electricity, the physical flow of a distinct amount 
of energy is not traceable. For that reason, TSOs organize trading between market 
participants within a balancing group and distinguish between feed-ins and feed-outs. 
Feed-ins can be generation within the control area or electricity imports from other 
control areas; feed-outs are consumption in the control area or exports. All incoming 
and outgoing flows in a control area are measured by the TSOs or the local distribution 
system operators (DSO). If a certain amount of electricity is sold by market 
participants, the corresponding quantity on the balancing group is considered a feed-
out, and on the corresponding balancing group of the buyer, it is considered a feed-in. 
Both market participants have to communicate the trading business to the respective 
TSO. Each balance sheet of a balancing group must correspond to inputs and 
withdrawals. Consequently, deviations may occur on the supply and/or demand side. 
An operator of a fossil-fueled power plant, for instance, may produce less electricity 
than expected because of an unplanned power plant outage. Other reasons for 
deviations in the balancing group could be forecast errors of the feed-in from RES or 
intermittent electricity demand. To adjust for these differences between incoming and 
outgoing flows, the balancing group manager has to use positive or negative control 
energy that is provided by the TSO. Table 2-1 presents an example for a balancing 
group. Since feed-outs exceed feed-ins, positive control energy has to be activated 
(Graeber, 2014). 
Table 2-1: Sample balancing group of a market participant  
    
Feed-in (MWh) Feed-out (MWh) 
Power plant X 115.31 Consumption S  1.35 
Power plant Y 42.12 Consumption T 11.20 
Buy Z 10.00 Sell U 90.00 
Positive control energy 5.12 Sell V 70.00 
Total 172.55 Total 172.55 
 
Source: Graeber (2014), modified  
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2.2 Control energy 
Due to the large number of balancing groups within a control area, deviations can be 
partly compensated for between the market participants. However, due to unforeseen 
events, supply and demand are never exactly in equilibrium. To balance out these 
differences, a TSO uses control energy. The required amount of control energy 
corresponds exactly to the balance of the control energy of all balancing groups. If the 
sum of the generation is smaller than the consumption, positive control energy is used. 
Conversely, if the generation is greater than the consumption, negative control energy 
is used. Positive control energy is usually provided by increasing the production of a 
power plant or activating reserve capacities, and negative control energy by reducing 
its production or increasing electricity demand (Graeber, 2014). 
Technically, an imbalance in the market can be detected by a deviation of the 
electricity grid frequency from the target size of 50 Hz. The frequency increases with 
an oversupply and decreases with an undersupply of electricity. Deviations can occur 
both on the demand side (e.g., by meteorological influences or inaccuracies in the load 
forecasts) and on the supply side (e.g., by power plant failures or forecast errors of 
RES). To provide sufficient positive or negative control energy, power plants must 
always be ready to reduce or increase their production (Consentec, 2014).  
In case of a deviation of the frequency, a call of control energy takes place 
immediately. For this purpose, primary control reserve is activated. It is maintained in 
large thermal power plants across the entire European interconnected grid and used in 
a decentralized and fully automatic manner depending on the grid frequency. The 
primary control reserve is organized so that it can immediately replace the outage of 
three large power plants at any time. The secondary control reserve is instantly 
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activated by the TSO in the control area of which the imbalance exists. Similarly, the 
tertiary control reserve is activated by the TSO if a disturbance exists for a long time. 
The price for the usage of control energy is determined via an auction mechanism and 
depends on the actual amount of the deviation. Because of the possibility to bid at 
negative prices for secondary and tertiary control reserves, the final balancing energy 
price can also be negative (Consentec, 2014). 
2.3 Price building 
Pricing on electricity spot markets is often described by the merit order model in the 
literature. In the short term, it is assumed that demand is price inelastic due to fixed-
price tariffs on the retail markets. The supply curve is assumed to depend on the short-
term marginal costs of the power plants, such as fuel costs and costs for CO2 
certificates. Accordingly, the supply curve represents an array of all power plants with 
rising marginal costs, the so-called merit order. The market-clearing price results from 
the marginal costs of the last of the power plants used to serve the demand. The 
fluctuations of the electricity price are thus mainly explained by changes in demand 
with respect to a constant power plant supply. Consequently, seasonality such as prices 
differences between weekdays and weekends can be analyzed with the merit order 
model (Graeber, 2014).  
However, modeled electricity prices may differ from those observed in reality. The 
reason is that the merit order model neglects the intertemporal relationships that are 
important for a power plant dispatch. For example, in addition to fuel costs, start-up 
and shutdown costs must be taken into account. In a situation with a large but short 
decline in demand, it is therefore often not economically reasonable for a power plant 
operator to shut down the generator. The short-term marginal costs are thus below the 
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fuel costs during off-peak demand and may be even negative (Fanone et al., 2013; 
Graeber, 2014). 
Power plant operators producing with RES have lower marginal costs than operators 
of fossil-fueled power plants. Consequently, hydropower, wind and photovoltaic 
would be prioritized in the merit order if these generators offer their capacities under 
competitive conditions. The feed-in of RES shifts the position of conventional power 
generators with higher marginal costs in the merit order to the right as depicted in 
Figure 2-2. As long as demand remains constant, the market price decreases. This 
impact is known as the merit order effect (Sensfuß et al., 2008; Zweifel et al., 2017).   
 
Figure 2-2: Merit order effect in the electricity spot market 
Source: Krohn et al. (2009), modified 
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2.4 Markets 
Trading with electricity on wholesale markets can be either exchange-based or settled 
over the counter (OTC). OTC trading is often carried out bilaterally or through 
organized trading platforms and brokers. Due to the low regulation and 
standardization, a high degree of flexibility and a large variety of delivery contracts 
are possible. However, OTC markets are often non-transparent and entail high 
transaction risks for the participants. In contrast, a power exchange offers trading at a 
high degree of transparency and with low transaction risks, but trading is restricted to 
frequently requested contracts. The most important wholesale markets are discussed 
in the following sections: forward, day-ahead and intraday markets (Graeber, 2014). 
2.4.1 Forward market 
Electricity with a long-term delivery horizon is traded on the forward market. On this 
market, power generators can hedge their production, and electricity distributors may 
obtain electricity in advance to provide consumers with price guarantees. Pricing on a 
forward market is determined by expectations of future spot market prices, which 
mainly depend on prices for primary energy sources. The shape of the forward price 
curve can be categorized in backwardation and contango. Backwardation describes a 
situation in which the current spot price is higher than the forward price. The market 
has a contango structure when forward prices exceed spot prices (Benth et al., 2008). 
An exchange-based forward market in Germany is organized by the European Energy 
Exchange (EEX) in Leipzig. It offers continuous trading of futures4 with delivery 
periods of one calendar week, one calendar month, one quarter and one calendar year. 
Futures can be traded with the delivery structure base as well as peak. Base means the 
                                                 
4 Forward contracts, bought on power exchanges, are called futures. 
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constant delivery of a quantity of electricity over the entire delivery period, while peak 
means only the delivery during the periods of high consumption on weekdays. Because 
of the fixed base or peak contract structure, the EEX future market is less suitable for 
trading with electricity from intermittent RES (Graeber, 2014; EEX, 2018). 
2.4.2 Day-ahead market 
On the day-ahead market, electricity contracts are traded with next-day delivery. 
Exchange-based trading for the German market area is possible at the Energy 
Exchange Austria (EXAA) in Vienna and the European Power Exchange (EPEX) in 
Paris. The EPEX, which is the largest power exchange in Central Europe, is a joint 
venture between EEX and the French power exchange Powernext. The day-ahead 
market is designed as a unit price auction market in which participants can bid until 
12 pm for contracts that involve the supply of electricity on the following day. 
Subsequently, EPEX will calculate a uniform market equilibrium price for each hour 
of the next day. In addition to single-hour bids, it is also possible to submit block bids 
that include several hourly contracts (EPEX SPOT SE, 2018a). 
Figure 2-3 displays the aggregated buy and sell curves of the uniform day-ahead price 
for the electricity delivery period on November 18, 2016 from 01:00 to 02:00. In this 
example, the market price is –12.10 €/MWh, implying that producers are willing to 
pay for selling electricity on the spot market. Due to a higher feed-in from RES in a 
period of low demand, even subsequent contracts were traded at negative prices of  
–10.00 €/MWh for the contract from 02:00 to 03:00 and –0.01 €/MWh for the contract 
from 03:00 to 04:00, respectively. 
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Figure 2-3: Market-clearing price in the EPEX day-ahead market 
Source: EPEX SPOT SE (2018a) 
The design of the day-ahead market enables trading with electricity produced from 
RES, since reliable generation forecasts are available one day in advance. However, 
significant deviations in actual production may occur due to the feed-in from 
intermittent energy sources. Demand on the day-ahead market does not represent end-
user demand, but that of wholesale market participants such as retailers with their own 
electricity production. Depending on the market price, it may be more rational to 
produce electricity themselves or to buy in the market (Graeber, 2014). 
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Figure 2-4: Social welfare with market coupling 
Source: Ochoa and van Ackere (2015), modified 
One additional feature of the day-ahead market is the coupling of several European 
market areas through a market coupling mechanism. The aim is welfare-optimized 
cross-border electricity trading against the background of the restriction of cross-
border transport capacities. The most important step toward an European market 
integration took place in 2014, when price coupling in north-western Europe was 
introduced and further extended in 2015. As a result, the area covers 19 countries, 
representing about 85% of European electricity consumption. The market coupling 
mechanism accesses the bids of all involved electricity exchanges and the available 
transport capacities and calculates welfare-optimal electricity flows between the 
market areas (EPEX SPOT SE, 2018b).  
As Figure 2-4 shows, social welfare with market coupling is calculated as the sum of 
the producer, consumer and interconnector surpluses. In the short term, a cross-border 
electricity trade increases the price in the exporting country and decreases the price in 
the importing country. This leads to surplus transfers between consumers and 
producers within both countries. The interconnector gains a congestion rent if 
electricity prices diverge (Ochoa and van Ackere, 2015). 
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2.4.3 Intraday market 
To enable market participants to react on deviations in the power plant production 
scheme, the EPEX organizes a continuous intraday market subsequent to the day-
ahead market. Electricity contracts can be traded on the same day up to 30 minutes 
before delivery. A market coupling mechanism, as in the day-ahead market, does not 
exist for the intraday market. However, the exchange framework allows cross-border 
transactions between the German, Austrian, French and Swiss market areas (EPEX 
SPOT SE, 2018c).  
Similar to on the day-ahead market, pricing on the intraday market can be explained 
by the merit order model. However, the number of participants and thus liquidity on 
the intraday market is significantly lower than on the day-ahead market. Especially at 
night and on weekends, only a few traders are active. The total trading volume on the 
German continuous intraday market was about 4 TWh in December 2016, which is 
below 20% of the volume on the day-ahead market. As a result, the supply curve on 
the intraday market is steeper than on the day-ahead market (Pape et al, 2016).  
Since fossil-fueled power plants require some lead time before activation, the potential 
liquidity on the intraday market decreases as the delivery horizon comes closer. 
Because of the possibility to trade until 30 minutes before delivery, the intraday market 
is suitable for balancing out forecast errors of RES, forecast errors in consumption and 
deviations in the power plant generation (e.g., unplanned power plant outages). 
However, the largest part of electricity produced through RES is still traded on the 
day-ahead market (Graeber, 2014). 
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Figure 2-5 depicts an example for different electricity spot prices. It summarizes prices 
for the hourly product 15:00-16:00 on the German continuous intraday market at 
October 24, 2016. The volume weighted average price is 57.28 €/MWh and takes into 
account the first trade at around 23:00 on October 23 and the last trade at around 14:30 
on October 24. In total, 633 trades took place during this time frame. The day-ahead 
price is 46.09 €/MWh and therefore, on average, is lower than intraday prices. Possible 
price drivers could be an overestimation of the feed-in from RES or unscheduled 
power plant non-usabilities.  
2.5 Risk premia in electricity markets 
In electricity markets, sellers and buyers are exposed to cost risks and revenue risks. 
Market participants have the possibility to hedge these risks by trading long-term 
contracts to close positions or by trading on short-term spot markets (Zweifel et al., 
2017). The difference between the forward price F and the expected spot price S is 
defined as the ex ante risk premium RP 5: 
𝑅𝑃𝑐 = 𝐹𝑐,𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡[𝑆𝑐,𝑡+1], 
(2.1) 
where c stands for the hourly contract at time t. To avoid wrong forecasts of the future 
spot price, the ex post approach with realized data is often used in the empirical 
literature (Haugom and Ullrich, 2012): 
𝑅𝑃𝑐 = 𝐹𝑐,𝑡 − 𝑆𝑐,𝑡+1 
        = 𝐹𝑐,𝑡 − 𝐸𝑡[𝑆𝑐,𝑡+1] + 𝐸𝑡[𝑆𝑐,𝑡+1] − 𝑆𝑐,𝑡+1. 
(2.2) 
                                                 
5 The risk premium is also known as "forward premium" in the literature. 
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Assuming random noise for the forecast error, it follows that evidence of a nonzero ex 
post premium is also evidence of a nonzero ex ante premium. The risk premium tends 
to be positive when the forward price is higher than the spot price and vice versa. The 
standard theoretical reference for the formation of a risk premium in electricity markets 
is Bessembinder and Lemmon's (2002) equilibrium model. The model takes into 
account the non-storable character of electricity and the convexity of producer’s cost 
function and explains the risk premium as an interplay between producer’s and 
retailer’s hedging pressure. It assumes that NP power producers and NR power retailers 
trade electricity in a competitive spot market in which power demand in the immediate 
future can be forecasted with precision. According to the model, each producer Pi has 
the following total cost function TCi: 
𝑇𝐶𝑖 = 𝐹 +
𝑎
𝑐
(𝑄𝑃𝑖)
𝑐
, 
(2.3) 
where F are fixed costs, a is a variable cost parameter, Q is the output and c is a 
constant with c >= 2. This cost function implies that marginal costs increase with 
output. Thus, it reflects a typical electricity industry with different production 
technologies and fuel sources such as nuclear, coal, oil and natural gas. The profit of 
producer πPi is defined as: 
𝜋𝑃𝑖 = 𝑃𝑊𝑄𝑃𝑖
𝑊 + 𝑃𝐹𝑄𝑃𝑖
𝐹 − 𝐹 −
𝑎
𝑐
(𝑄𝑃𝑖)
𝑐
, 
(2.4) 
where PW denotes the spot price, QPi
W the quantity sold by producer i in the spot market 
and QPi
F the quantity bought or sold in the forward market at the fixed price PF. Each 
producer’s physical production QPi is consequently the sum of its quantities sold on 
the spot and forward markets (QPi
W + QPi
F). 
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The retailer Rj can buy or sell electricity forward and buys on the spot market the 
difference between realized retail demand and their forward trades. Consequently, the 
profit of retailer πRj is defined as: 
𝜋𝑅𝑗 = 𝑃𝑅𝑄𝑅𝑗 + 𝑃𝐹𝑄𝑅𝑗
𝐹 − 𝑃𝑊(𝑄𝑅𝑗 + 𝑄𝑅𝑗
𝐹 ), 
(2.5) 
where PR denotes the fixed retail price, QRj the realized retail demand and QRj
F the 
quantity traded on the forward market. Note that QRj
F is negative if the retailer buys 
electricity forward. The first derivative of Equation (2.4) with respect to QPi
W yields 
the quantity sold by one producer in the spot market: 
𝑄𝑃𝑖
𝑊 = (
𝑃𝑊
𝑎
)
𝑥
− 𝑄𝑃𝑖
𝐹  , 
(2.6) 
where x is 1/(c - 1). Since total producer supply QP (= Np (QPi
W + QPi
F)) must equal 
total retail demand QD (= ∑ 𝑄𝑅𝑗
𝑁𝑅
𝑗=1 ), the market-clearing spot price PW can be 
expressed as: 
𝑃𝑊 = 𝑎 (
𝑄𝐷
𝑁𝑃
)
𝑐−1
, 
(2.7) 
where Np is the number of producers. Substituting Equation (2.7) in Equation (2.6) 
yields each producer’s sales in the spot market:  
𝑄𝑃𝑖
𝑊 =
𝑄𝐷
𝑁𝑃
− 𝑄𝑃𝑖
𝐹  . 
(2.8) 
To determine the optimal forward quantities by the producers and retailers, 
Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) consider the respective profits first in the absence 
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of any forward positions. This implies that QPi
F and QRj
F are set as zero, which leads 
to the profits ρPi and ρRj: 
𝜌𝑃𝑖 = 𝑃𝑊 (
𝑄𝐷
𝑁𝑃
) − 𝐹 −
𝑎
𝑐
(
𝑄𝐷
𝑁𝑃
)
𝑐
, 
(2.9) 
and 
𝜌𝑅𝑗 = 𝑃𝑅𝑄𝑅𝑗 − 𝑃𝑊𝑄𝑅𝑗 
(2.10) 
Following Anderson and Danthine (1980) as well as Hirshleifer and Subramanyam 
(1993), the optimal forward position for producers and retailers is given by: 
𝑄(𝑃,𝑅)𝑖
𝐹 =
𝑃𝐹 − 𝐸(𝑃𝑊)
𝐴𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑃𝑊)
+
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜌(𝑃,𝑅)𝑖, 𝑃𝑊)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑃𝑊)
, 
(2.11) 
where A is a measure for the volatility risk of the market participant.6 The first term on 
the right-hand side of Equation (2.11) can be interpreted as the amount of bought/sold 
forward contracts to speculate on the difference between the forward and the expected 
spot price. The second term on the right-hand side of Equation (2.11) reflects 
participant’s risks that the forward market can potentially hedge. The profit of 
producers depends on the generation costs and the revenues from sales to the retailers, 
whereas the profit of retailers depends on the costs of acquiring electricity and the 
revenues from sales to customers. Since producer’s revenues equal retailer’s costs, the 
equilibrium forward price depends on the variability in retail revenues and in 
production costs.  
                                                 
6 For the sake of simplicity, Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) argue that both market participants are 
equally concerned with risk. Using heterogeneous risk coefficients impacts only the magnitude, but not 
the sign of the risk premium. 
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The covariance in Equation (2.11) is calculated for producers and retailers, 
respectively: 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜌𝑃𝑖, 𝑃𝑊) = 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑎 (
𝑄𝐷
𝑁𝑝
)
𝑐
− 𝐹 −
𝑎
𝑐
(
𝑄𝐷
𝑁𝑝
)
𝑐
, 𝑃𝑊) 
=
1
𝑎𝑥
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝑊
𝑥+1, 𝑃𝑊) −
1
𝑐𝑎𝑥
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝑊
𝑥+1, 𝑃𝑊). 
(2.12) 
Analogous, the covariance between retailer’s profits and the spot price can be 
expressed as: 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝜌𝑅𝑗, 𝑃𝑊) = 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝑅𝑄𝑅𝑗 − 𝑃𝑊𝑄𝑅𝑗, 𝑃𝑊) 
= 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑄𝑅𝑗, 𝑃𝑊) − 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝑊𝑄𝑅𝑗, 𝑃𝑊). 
(2.13) 
Substituting Equations (2.12) and (2.13) accordingly in Equation (2.11) yields forward 
demand for the producers: 
𝑄𝑃𝑖
𝐹 =
𝑃𝐹 − 𝐸(𝑃𝑊)
𝐴𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑃𝑊)
+
1
𝑎𝑥
(1 −
1
𝑐
)
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝑊
𝑥+1, 𝑃𝑊)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑃𝑊)
 , 
(2.14) 
and forward demand for the retailers: 
𝑄𝑅𝑗
𝐹 =
𝑃𝐹 − 𝐸(𝑃𝑊)
𝐴𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑃𝑊)
+ 𝑃𝑅
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑄𝑅𝑗, 𝑃𝑊)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑃𝑊)
−
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝑊𝑄𝑅𝑗, 𝑃𝑊)
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑃𝑊)
. 
(2.15) 
The equilibrium forward price is derived from adding the sum of the optimal forward 
positions of all producers NP and retailers NR: 
∑ 𝑄𝑃𝑖
𝐹
𝑁𝑃
𝑖=1
+ ∑ 𝑄𝑅𝑗
𝐹
𝑁𝑅
𝑗=1
= 0 
(2.16) 
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Substituting QPi
F by Equation (2.14) and QRj
F by Equation (2.15) and solving after PF, 
the forward price can be formulated as: 
𝑃𝐹 = 𝐸(𝑃𝑊) −
𝑁𝑃𝐴
(𝑁𝑅 + 𝑁𝑃)𝑐𝑎𝑥
[𝑐𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝑊
𝑥 , 𝑃𝑊) − 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝑊
𝑥+1, 𝑃𝑊)]. 
(2.17) 
The forward price converges to the expected spot price if the number of firms in the 
industry (NR + NP) goes to infinity or if risk is irrelevant to the industry (A = 0). Using 
second-order Taylor series expansions, Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) rewrite 
Equation (2.17) as: 
𝑃𝐹 − 𝐸(𝑃𝑊) = 𝛼𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑃𝑊) + 𝛾𝑆𝑘𝑒𝑤(𝑃𝑊), 
(2.18) 
where α and γ are represented as follows: 
𝛼 ≡
𝑁𝑃(𝑥 + 1)𝐴
(𝑁𝑅 + 𝑁𝑃)𝑐𝑎𝑥
([𝐸(𝑃𝑊)]
𝑥 − 𝑃𝑅[𝐸(𝑃𝑊)]
𝑥−1) 
(2.19) 
𝛾 ≡
𝑁𝑃(𝑥 + 1)𝐴
2(𝑁𝑅 + 𝑁𝑃)𝑐𝑎𝑥
(𝑥[𝐸(𝑃𝑊)]
𝑥−1 − (𝑥 − 1)𝑃𝑅[𝐸(𝑃𝑊)]
𝑥−2) . 
(2.20) 
To induce risk-averse retailers NR to enter the industry, the fixed retail price PR must 
exceed the expected spot price, which results in α < 0 and γ > 0. Consequently, the 
model leads to the relationship in which the risk premium is negatively related in the 
variance of the spot price distribution and upward biased when the price skewness of 
the spot price distribution is large.  
This result can be explained because spot prices are positively related with demand, 
profits of retailers are increasing in demand and profits of retailers are decreasing in 
prices. An increase in spot price variance will increase the number of high demand 
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realizations and therefore increase the profit of retailers, since the effect of higher 
demand-induced revenues outweighs the negative effect of higher demand-induced 
spot prices, on average. However, the increase in variance will also increase the 
number of low demand realizations and has a negative impact on retailer's profits. 
Consequently, retailers have an incentive to hedge this risk by selling electricity 
forward, resulting in lower forward prices (van Koten, 2016).  
A higher spot price skewness implies a higher probability of price spikes. As a result, 
retailer's profits are affected negatively. Therefore, retailers prefer to hedge against 
this risk by buying more electricity in the forward market, resulting in higher forward 
prices. Taking everything into consideration, the risk premium represents a 
compensation for bearing price and/or demand risks. Using simulations based on 
Equation (2.17) and Equation (2.18), Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) derive four 
hypotheses with respect to the equilibrium risk premium.7 
Hypothesis 1: The equilibrium risk premium decreases in the anticipated variance of 
spot prices, ceteris paribus.  
Hypothesis 2: The equilibrium risk premium increases in the anticipated skewness of 
spot prices, ceteris paribus.  
Hypothesis 3: The equilibrium risk premium is convex, initially decreasing and then 
increasing, in the variability of power demand, ceteris paribus.  
Hypothesis 4: The equilibrium risk premium increases in expected power demand, 
ceteris paribus.  
                                                 
7 Van Koten (2016) is able to replicate Hypotheses 3 and 4, but not Hypotheses 1 and 2. However, 
further simulations support an adjustment of Bessembinder and Lemmon's (2002) model with flexible 
retail tariffs instead of the assumption of a fixed retail tariff. 
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Hypotheses 1, 2 and 4 build the theoretical framework for many empirical studies and 
are either supported or not supported. For instance, Longstaff and Wang’s (2004) study 
for the PJM market confirms that risk premia are negatively related to the variance of 
spot prices and positively related to the skewness of spot prices. However, Haugom 
and Ullrich (2012) revisit the PJM market, and their results point to highly unstable or 
even opposite signs for variance and skewness.  
Empirical studies examining risk premia in German electricity markets follow the 
methodological approach by Longstaff and Wang (2004). They can be subdivided into 
studies that calculate the risk premium exactly as the difference between 
forward/future and spot prices and studies in which the price of a spot market is 
compared with the price of a subsequent spot market.  
Redl et al. (2009) investigate the price formation in the EEX future market and discuss 
the relevance of forecast errors of supply- and demand-side shocks.  Comparing prices 
of month-ahead futures with monthly average day-ahead prices, the study presents 
evidence for a positive mean risk premium and confirms Bessembinder and Lemmon's 
(2002) hypothesis that the skewness of spot prices plays an important role for the risk 
assessment of market participants. However, the results do not provide evidence for a 
negative influence of the variability in spot prices, but for a positive impact on the risk 
premium.   
Redl and Bunn (2013) extend the study by Redl et al. (2009) and analyze further 
determinants of the risk premium besides the variance and skewness of the spot prices. 
The authors conclude that the electricity risk premium is a rather complex function of 
fundamental and behavioral components such as fossil fuel prices, market conduct and 
unexpected changes in supply and demand.  
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Fleten et al. (2015) investigate the presence of an “overnight risk premium” (i.e., the 
first difference of the daily forward price) for quarterly, monthly and yearly futures on 
the EEX future market. Their findings point to a decrease in risk premia over time as 
the respective future contracts approach the delivery (“front”) period. Including the 
variance and skewness of EPEX day-ahead prices as explanatory variables in the 
regression, the results also present evidence that the overnight risk premium is 
negatively related to the variability of spot prices and positively related to the skewness 
of spot prices. 
Daskalakis and Markellos (2009) analyze whether the initiation of the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme has an impact on the pricing of electricity forward. Using 
daily prices of the EPEX day-ahead and the subsequent EPEX continuous intraday 
market, their results point to a positive relationship between carbon allowance returns 
and risk premia. This conjecture is driven by substantial uncertainties about the carbon 
market. To hedge against unexpected price changes of carbon allowances, sellers of 
forward contracts may require a “carbon risk premium.” Furthermore, Daskalakis and 
Markellos (2009) present evidence for the presence of a negative and statistically 
significant mean risk premium on the German electricity market. 
Viehmann (2011) analyzes risk premia in Germany using data of the EXAA and EPEX 
day-ahead market from October 2005 to September 2008. Since auction results on the 
EXAA are published two hours in advance, a corresponding price for an electricity 
contract on the EXAA can be interpreted as a forward (price), whereas its price on the 
EPEX is the respective spot (price). The results of the empirical investigation suggest 
that market participants are willing to pay significant negative risk premia in periods 
of low demand and positive risk premia during peak hours, which aligns with 
Hypothesis 4 of the model by Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002).  
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Table 2-2: Overview of empirical studies for German electricity markets 
   
Study Data used 
Redl et al. (2009) EEX futures and EPEX day-ahead 
Redl and Bunn (2013) EEX futures and EPEX day-ahead 
Fleten et al. (2015) EEX futures and EPEX day-ahead 
  
Daskalakis and Markellos (2009)  EPEX day-ahead and EPEX intraday 
Viehmann (2011)  EXAA day-ahead and EPEX day-ahead 
 
Chapter 4 of this dissertation replicates Viehmann's (2011) study and extends the 
empirical analysis to previous years, when electricity prices had to be positive. 
Furthermore, it addresses the impact of negative prices on risk premia. Negative price 
bids for the German market were first introduced on September 1, 2008, at the EPEX 
and on October 15, 2013, at the EXAA.  
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3 Price elasticity of demand in the German day-ahead 
electricity market 
3.1 Introduction 
At the beginning of the year 2010, the electricity market in Germany experienced a 
remarkable institutional change. Since January 1st 2010, German transmission system 
operators are required to trade energy produced under the Renewable Energy Act 
(REA) on spot markets. Producers of electricity from renewable energy sources (RES) 
receive a fixed feed-in tariff for each kilowatt hour produced, which network operators 
sell directly over power exchanges. As a result, the supply of RES significantly 
influences the price formation on spot markets. 
This paper quantifies the price elasticity of electricity demand in the European Power 
Exchange (EPEX) day-ahead market for Germany. We argue that due to the 
institutional change at the beginning of 2010, wind speed has become a suitable 
instrumental variable for the price on this market. This is not the first study quantifying 
the price elasticity of demand using data of day-ahead spot markets and employing an 
instrumental variable approach. Lijesen (2007) uses the lagged price as an instrumental 
variable for the clearing price. As in our study, Graf and Wozabal (2013) also use price 
data of the EPEX day-ahead market. However, they use prices for primary energy and 
emission rights as instrumental variables for the market price. Their results (Table 5, 
p. 957) point to a statistically insignificant or even positive relationship between spot 
price and load. Our results indicate a negative and statistically significant relationship 
between spot prices and traded volumes. 
This paper is organized as follows. The following section reviews the literature with 
respect to estimation methods of price elasticity of electricity demand. Section 3.3 
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explains the EPEX day-ahead market for electricity and discusses the effects of RES 
on the price formation. Section 3.4 presents the methodology and the estimation 
results. Section 3.5 concludes. 
3.2 Literature review 
Empirical studies on price elasticity of electricity demand differ in the type of 
estimation approaches. The economic standard is conducting an ordinary least squares 
(OLS) estimation from a loglinear model, since the estimated coefficients can be 
directly interpreted as elasticities. Several studies implement an autoregressive 
distributive lag (ARDL) framework to estimate short- and long-run elasticities of 
residential electricity demand (Narayan and Smyth, 2005; Halicioglu, 2007).  
Kamerschen and Porter (2004) estimate price elasticities for the residential and 
industrial sector as well as for the total demand in the U.S. from 1973-1998. They use 
a three-stage least square (3SLS) estimation approach on different versions of a 
simultaneous supply and demand model. The results suggest higher values for 
households (–0.85 to –0.94) and more inelastic figures for industrial (–0.34 to –0.55) 
and total electricity demand (–0.13 to –0.55).  
Alberini et al. (2011) analyze residential demand for electricity in the U.S. using 
generalized least squares (GLS) regressions over the period 1997-2007. To test the 
robustness of the estimation, the authors use the instruments' state-level electricity 
price and lagged price for the average electricity price faced by the residential 
customers. The obtained elasticities of about –0.67 to –0.86 suggest some potential for 
pricing policies in contrast to prior studies.  
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Schulte and Heindl (2017) investigate price and income elasticities of residential 
electricity and heating demand in Germany from 1993 to 2008 by applying a quadratic 
expenditure system. Their results suggest a price elasticity for electricity of –0.43. 
The price elasticity of electricity demand on spot markets, however, is rarely discussed 
in the literature. Earle (2000) calculates the demand responsiveness on the California 
Power Exchange day-ahead market directly at the respective market-clearing price and 
quantity. The results suggest that the price elasticity of electricity is elastic in 27% of 
trading hours, but in more than 50% of hours, it is less than –0.10.  
Johnsen (2001) adopts a full information maximum likelihood procedure to estimate 
price responsiveness of the Norwegian electricity day-ahead market from 1994 to 
1995. Since the local electricity sector is mainly hydro-based, expectations of future 
weather conditions play an important role. Changes in temperature or snowfall may 
heavily influence the dispatch of water storages, which are able to cover about 75% of 
the annual generation. Therefore, market supply can be associated with the producer’s 
current valuation of storage levels. The obtained elasticities derived from weekly data 
lie between –0.05 to –0.35.  
Lijesen (2007) estimates price elasticity of demand on the Dutch day-ahead electricity 
market with a loglinear model. To avoid endogeneity problems, a 2SLS approach is 
used with lagged price as an instrumental variable for price. Electricity demand is 
proxied by the total system load (i.e., consumption) on an hourly basis. The results 
point to an inelastic value of –0.03 during peak load periods in 2003.  
Graf and Wozabal (2013) investigate competitiveness of the EPEX day-ahead market 
in Germany with a conjectural variations approach and a fundamental market model. 
They find evidence that the spot market was competitive from 2007 to 2010. To 
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estimate the marginal impact of price on quantity, the authors use prices for primary 
energy and emission rights as instrumental variables for the market price. However, 
their results point also to a statistically insignificant or even positive relationship 
between spot price and load, which indicates that prices for primary energy and 
emission rights might not be suitable instrumental variables for the day-ahead price.  
3.3 Identification strategy  
In the past decade, electricity from RES has become more important in Germany due 
to the support by the REA. The electricity generated from wind turbines, for instance, 
is fed into the grid of the closest distribution system operator (DSO), which pays a 
specified feed-in tariff. Next, the network operator provides the electricity completely 
to an upstream transmission system operator (TSO) and in turn receives the feed-in 
tariff back.  
 
Figure 3-1: Marketing mechanism after the institutional change in 2010 
Source: Ketterer (2014), modified 
40 
Before 2010, all TSOs assigned the electricity quantities and financial burdens to 
electricity supply companies in the respective service area. These costs were covered 
by the end user with a REA-levy or through the establishment of a dedicated green 
energy tariff. The electricity from RES was traded over the counter (OTC) and 
influenced the demand in the EPEX day-ahead market. Since supply companies bought 
the electricity in advance, the residual demand was cleared with the capacities on 
power exchanges (Sensfuß et al., 2008).  
Since 2010, electricity from RES has to be sold at the day-ahead market because of an 
amendment in the REA, the so-called Ausgleichsmechanismusverordnung (Ketterer, 
2014). Figure 3-1 illustrates the physical and monetary flows from the installations to 
the end users. TSOs receive revenues from selling renewable power on the wholesale 
market and the REA-levy paid by the customers. The location of the electricity 
exchange, although not legally defined, is in practice the EPEX day-ahead market.  
This institutional change has had important implications for the influence of RES both 
on the supply side and the demand side of the EPEX day-ahead market. Since 2010, 
the influence of RES has been restricted to the supply side of the market. Figure 3-2 
shows the daily traded volume on the day-ahead market for the years 2006 to 2014. 
The reason for the drastic increase at the beginning of 2010 is the amendment in the 
REA. An increase (decrease) in electricity from RES that has to be sold at the spot 
market implies that the marginal costs of the price determining power plant tend to be 
lower (higher). Consequently, an increase (decrease) in electricity from RES leads 
ceteris paribus to a decrease (increase) in the spot market price. In contrast, the demand 
side of the EPEX day-ahead market is no longer directly affected by changes in 
electricity from RES.  
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Figure 3-2: Daily electricity volume traded on EPEX day-ahead market in the years 2006 to 
2014 
 
This institutional change allows us to deal with the endogeneity problem arising from 
the simultaneity of price and output. To estimate the price elasticity of demand in the 
EPEX day-ahead market, we use an instrumental variable approach. In particular, we 
use wind speed to instrument for the spot market price. Wind energy has the highest 
share of RES in the market area, its production essentially being determined by wind 
speed.  
To identify the causal effect of price changes on electricity demand in the EPEX day-
ahead market, the instrumental variable (wind speed) has to be strongly correlated with 
the spot market price. At the same time, it has to influence the demand only indirectly 
via its effect on the spot price. While we expect to find a strong negative correlation 
between wind speed and spot price before and after 2010, we argue that wind speed is 
not a valid instrument before 2010. The exclusion restriction only holds after the 
institutional change because the demand side in the EPEX day-ahead market was 
directly affected by wind energy before 2010. In contrast, only the supply side is 
affected by wind energy after the amendment in the REA. 
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3.4 Data and results 
This study combines data obtained from two different sources for the observation 
period from January 2006 to December 2014. First, EPEX’s website provides 
information about the electricity volumes and prices for each trading hour on the day-
ahead market. Second, we use the climate panel provided by the German weather 
service (Deutscher Wetter Dienst, DWD). The climate panel contains information such 
as wind speed, temperature and sunshine duration from more than 70 weather stations 
in Germany. We use the average hourly wind speeds measured at these stations as our 
instrumental variable for the respective hourly spot market price. Sunshine duration 
per hour s and the average temperature te are used as further control variables. In 
addition, we include dummy variables C for hours, weekends, months and years to 
control for time-specific effects.  
In our econometric specification, we make use of the market-clearing price and 
quantity; i.e. the hourly traded volume q is the dependent variable and the respective 
hourly market price p is the (endogenous) explanatory variable: 
𝑙𝑛(q𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑙𝑛(p𝑡) + 𝛽2𝑙𝑛(te𝑡) + 𝛽3𝑙𝑛(s𝑡) + 𝛾′𝐶𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡, 
 (3.1) 
with t = 1, …, N where N indicates the number of hours in the sample. We use a log-
log specification of the demand equation that implies that the estimated coefficient of 
the logarithm of the instrumented market price represents the price elasticity of 
demand in the EPEX market.  
Graf and Wozabal (2013) and Lijesen (2007) use load as the dependent variable, i.e., 
the total electricity demand. Lijesen (2007, p. 254) provides two major arguments for 
estimating the effect of spot market prices on total demand. First, he argues that “this 
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approach captures both the effects in the spot market itself as well as the effects on the 
OTC contracts with prices linked to the spot price.” However, this argument is only 
valid if the agreed-upon prices in OTC contracts are linked to the spot price. 
Unfortunately, the contents of bilateral OTC contracts are usually undisclosed 
information (Lijesen, 2007).  
Second, Lijesen (2007, p. 254) states that this approach avoids “the measurement 
problems related to distinguishing between demand and supply on the spot market.” 
We argue that our instrumental variable allows us to deal with this endogeneity 
problem. Nevertheless, using the hourly traded volume instead of load implies that our 
estimates do not represent the price elasticity of total electricity demand with respect 
to spot market price, but rather the price elasticity of demand (bids) in the EPEX day-
ahead market.  
Tests of endogeneity (Durbin, Wu-Hausman) reject the null hypothesis that the price 
variable is exogenous, which implies that OLS estimates would be biased (see 
Appendix Table A. 1). All variables are furthermore checked for the presence of a unit 
root by performing Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests with and without a trend. 
The results suggest that all variables in the regressions are stationary (see Appendix 
Table A. 2). The results of simple OLS regressions suggest a positive relationship 
between price and volume in the years before the amendment in the REA. Although 
the effect is negative after the policy change, the estimated coefficients are biased (see 
Appendix Table A. 3 and Table A. 4). 
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Table 3-1: Second-stage estimation results before the policy change  
 
  Years before amendment in REA 
VARIABLES 2006-2009 2006 2007 2008 2009  
          
Price -0.0488*** -0.0562*** -0.0188 0.0885*** -0.0657  
 (0.0042) (0.0113) (0.0172) (0.0094) (0.0659)  
Temperature -0.3450*** -0.892*** -0.579*** -0.520*** -0.973***  
 (0.0495) (0.0588) (0.161) (0.0369) (0.424)  
Sunshine -0.0076*** -0.00311 -0.00613*** -0.00631*** 0.000389  
 (0.00067) (0.00243) (0.000185) (0.00142) (0.00118)  
         
Dummies         
Hour Yes Yes 
Weekend Yes Yes 
Month Yes Yes 
Year Yes No 
         
Observations 34,914 8,749 8,731 8,748 8,686  
         
F-Test  
(Wind speed) 2,196.09*** 202.45*** 1,062.45*** 34.12*** 41.55***  
(First-stage)            
 
Autocorrelation and robust standard errors as proposed by Andrews (1991) in parentheses. 
Dependent variable: logarithm of hourly traded volume. 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table 3-2: Second-stage estimation results after the policy change  
 
  Years after amendment in REA 
VARIABLES 2010-2014 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
          
Price -0.432*** -0.907*** -0.733*** -0.393*** -0.258*** -0.318*** 
 (0.0754) (0.0334) (0.0619) (0.0687) (0.0181) (0.00684) 
Temperature -0.795* -3.214*** -1.481** -0.822*** -0.345 -0.297*** 
 (0.421) (0.679) (0.588) (0.296) (0.223) (0.114) 
Sunshine -0.00873*** -0.00857 -0.0165*** -0.00769*** -0.000322 -0.0108*** 
 (0.000326) (0.00826) (0.00204) (0.00142) (0.00190) (0.00327) 
         
Dummies         
Hour Yes Yes 
Weekend Yes Yes 
Month Yes Yes 
Year Yes No 
         
Observations 43,609 8,748 8,744 8,726 8,695 8,696 
         
F-Test  
(Wind speed) 58.15*** 1901.10*** 208.31*** 95.59*** 98.19*** 692.60*** 
(First-stage)            
 
Autocorrelation and robust standard errors as proposed by Andrews (1991) in parentheses. 
Dependent variable: logarithm of hourly traded volume. 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3-1 and Table 3-2 summarize the results of the second stage of two-stage least 
square regressions (2SLS) for the observation periods before and after the institutional 
change, respectively. In column one of Table 3-1, we report the results of the second 
stage regressions covering the period from 2006 to 2009. The estimated price elasticity 
is about –0.05 and is statistically significant. Note that the exclusion restriction does 
not hold for this period because wind speed may also affect the demand side of the 
EPEX day-ahead market. Hence, this estimate is likely to be biased. Likewise, the 
results of regressions conducted for each year before the institutional change tend to 
be biased, too. The estimated price elasticities are not statistically significant (2007 
and 2009) or positive significant (2008), which underscores the violation of the 
exclusion restriction. Only the point estimate for 2006 suggests a negative relationship 
between electricity price and traded volume. 
In contrast, the estimate of the price elasticity of demand obtained from 2SLS 
regressions for the period after the policy change should be unbiased. The point 
estimate for average price elasticity of demand is about –0.43 and statistically 
significant, implying an inelastic demand. In more detail, results of regressions 
performed separately for each year of the period from 2010 to 2014 suggest that 
electricity demand became less elastic over the years. The point estimate of the price 
elasticity is about –0.91 in 2010, but its average value is around –0.32 in the period 
from 2012 to 2014. Moreover, the hypothesis of weak instruments can be rejected with 
a F-test on the coefficient of the variable wind speed in the first stage regression (Stock 
et al., 2002). 
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Figure 3-3: Price elasticity of demand – point estimates and the 95% confidence intervals 
 
As explained above, we argue that the instrumental variable wind speed is only valid 
after the amendment in the REA. Figure 3-3 illustrates the differences between the 
2SLS estimates before and after the institutional change providing point estimates of 
the price elasticity of demand within the respective 95% confidence intervals. All point 
estimates are negative and statistically significant after the institutional change, while 
this is not the case before 2010: For 2008 the point estimate is even positive. In general, 
our results suggest that wind speed is a valid instrument for the spot market price from 
2010 onwards. 
The log specification in Equation (3.1) leads to the consequence that negative 
electricity prices are excluded in the regressions. However, the sample after the regime 
switch in 2010 includes 211 negative prices, which might distort the presented 
elasticities. Negative prices reduce the yearly mean of the spot prices when compared 
to a sample with only positive prices. To control for this effect, we estimate Equation 
(3.1) again, but without a log-specification for electricity prices. This approach is 
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conducted for yearly samples with and without negative prices, respectively. 
Afterwards, the estimated coefficients for the variable price are multiplied with the 
ratio between the mean price and the mean traded volume for every year.  
Table 3-3 summarizes the year-specific estimates for the price elasticity of demand 
from the log-model as well as the hand-calculated elasticities with and without 
negative electricity prices. All estimates suggest a decrease in the absolute value 
during the period from 2010 to 2013. While the results for the log-model point to 
inelastic values in general, the hand-calculated elasticities suggest an elastic 
relationship in the years 2010 and 2011. Including negative electricity prices leads to 
a decrease in the absolute value of the point estimates. 
Table 3-3: Summary of year-specific elasticities  
 
 Years after amendment in REA 
 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
        
Log-model -0.91 -0.73 -0.39 -0.26 -0.32 
      
Adjusted model without neg. prices -1.34 -1.06 -0.54 -0.34 -0.45 
      
Adjusted model with neg. prices -1.31 -1.04 -0.48 -0.33 -0.42 
         
 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
This paper provides estimates for the price elasticity of demand in the EPEX day-ahead 
market using wind speed as an instrumental variable for the market price. Our 
identification strategy is based on an institutional change at the beginning of the year 
2010. We argue and provide empirical evidence that wind speed is a valid instrument 
after this change but not before. Our estimation results suggest that the average price 
elasticity of demand in the EPEX day-ahead market is about –0.43 in the period from 
2010 to 2014. In the first two years after the policy change, the absolute value of the 
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point estimate is even higher (0.91 in 2010) but it declined over time and is around 
0.32 in the years from 2012 to 2014.  
It can be presumed that the price elasticity of demand was relatively high in the first 
two years after the institutional change because it took time for the market actors to 
adapt to the new institutional setting. However, an in-depth analysis of the underlying 
reasons for this decrease is beyond the scope of this study. Moreover, future research 
might use wind speed as an instrumental variable to investigate market power in the 
EPEX day-ahead market. 
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Appendix A 
Table A. 1: Durbin and Wu-Hausman tests of endogeneity 
    
  Years after amendment in REA 
 2010-2014 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
          
HAC score chi2 529.6*** 63.3*** 134.8*** 148.3*** 106.4*** 191.1*** 
       
HAC regression 177.9*** 3482.6*** 1124.8*** 110.3*** 4676.5*** 3314.0*** 
 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table A. 2: Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for unit root 
   
Log_Variables ADF test statistic  ADF test statistic with trend 
Volume -4.628*** -12.095*** 
Price -14.889*** -15.295*** 
Wind speed -21.685*** -21.770*** 
Temperature -6.931*** -6.925*** 
Sunshine -13.718*** -13.737*** 
   
Automatic lag selection: Schwarz information criterion. 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.   
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Table A. 3: OLS regression results before the policy change 
 
  Years before amendment in REA 
VARIABLES 2006-2009 2006 2007 2008 2009  
          
Price -0.0104*** -0.0260*** 0.0152*** 0.0101*** 0.00466**   
(0.00111) (0.00215) (0.00176) (0.00181) (0.00229)  
Temperature -0.0874** -0.789*** -0.401*** -0.607*** -0.726***   
(0.0431) (0.0786) (0.0721) (0.0713) (0.111)  
Sunshine -0.00732*** -0.00296*** -0.00446*** -0.00841*** 0.000409   
(0.000666) (0.00107) (0.00102) (0.00103) (0.00143)  
       
Dummies         
Hour Yes Yes 
Weekend Yes Yes 
Month Yes Yes 
Year Yes No 
         
Constant 9.769*** 13.71*** 11.79*** 13.13*** 13.70***  
 (0.243) (0.441) (0.406) (0.401) (0.620)  
Observations 34,914 8,749 8,731 8,748 8,686  
Adjusted R² 0.829 0.382 0.728 0.689 0.496  
 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
Dependent variable: logarithm of hourly traded volume. 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table A. 4: OLS regression results after the policy change 
 
  Years after amendment in REA 
VARIABLES 2010-2014 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
          
Price -0.0834*** -0.0478*** -0.108*** -0.0833*** -0.0650*** -0.103*** 
 
(0.00130) (0.00343) (0.00384) (0.00283) (0.00222) (0.00236) 
Temperature 1.275*** 1.238*** 0.477*** 1.436*** 1.139*** 1.526*** 
 
(0.0422) (0.102) (0.100) (0.0840) (0.0894) (0.108) 
Sunshine -0.00149** -0.0106*** -0.00316** 0.000588 0.00764*** -0.000483 
 
(0.000677) (0.00161) (0.00142) (0.00139) (0.00134) (0.00142) 
         
Dummies         
Hour Yes Yes 
Weekend Yes Yes 
Month Yes Yes 
Year Yes No 
         
Constant 3.091*** 3.111*** 7.787*** 2.401*** 3.923*** 1.966*** 
 (0.237) (0.573) (0.565) (0.474) (0.503) (0.605) 
Observations 43,609 8,748 8,744 8,726 8,695 8,696 
Adjusted R² 0.668 0.580 0.630 0.651 0.650 0.685 
 
Standard errors in parentheses. 
Dependent variable: logarithm of hourly traded volume. 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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4 Risk premia in the German day-ahead electricity market 
revisited: The impact of negative prices 
4.1 Introduction 
The process of energy market liberalization in Europe and the growth in the supply of 
electricity from intermittent renewable energy sources (RES) led to a significant 
increase in trading activities on the day-ahead markets in Germany. Due to the fact 
that electricity cannot be economically stored, and because forecasts of spot prices are 
often inaccurate, risk management plays an important role for both producers and 
retailers (Redl et al., 2009). A risk premium, defined as the difference between the 
forward price and the expected spot price, is often paid as a compensation for bearing 
price and/or demand risks.  
The presence of risk premia in the German day-ahead market is empirically examined 
in a study by Viehmann (2011), where the risk premium is measured as the difference 
between the Energy Exchange Austria (EXAA) price and the European Power 
Exchange (EPEX) price for an identical hourly contract.8 Since EXAA auction results 
are published two hours in advance, traders on the EPEX have time left to adjust their 
bidding strategy until the gate closes (Ziel et al., 2015). The results of Viehmann 
(2011) suggest that market participants are willing to pay significant negative risk 
premia in periods of low demand and positive risk premia during peak hours, which is 
in line with the prediction of a theoretical model developed by Bessembinder and 
Lemmon (2002).  
                                                 
8 The original paper used the name EEX day-ahead prices instead of EPEX day-ahead prices. The power 
exchange, EEX Power Spot, changed its name in EPEX SPOT SE in 2009.  
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This paper revisits risk premia in the German day-ahead market for electricity. Besides 
replicating the study by Viehmann (2011), it makes the following contributions to the 
literature: First, it extends the original analysis with data of more than three preceding 
years. Second, this paper investigates the impact of the introduction of negative prices 
on risk premia. Negative price bids for the German market were first introduced on 
September 1, 2008 at the EPEX. Negative price bids at the EXAA have been possible 
since October 15, 2013. Although not empirically investigated, Viehmann (2011) 
assumes the impact of negative electricity prices on risk premia: “It remains to be seen 
how the introduction of negative prices will affect negative risk premiums of weekend 
night hours in the future. Negative prices might result in a left-skewed price 
distribution and larger negative premiums for the hours affected” (Viehmann 2011, p. 
393). 
The results of this paper suggest that estimates for risk premia, as presented in 
Viehmann (2011), can only be replicated in part. There are large differences in the 
presented significance levels, which could be caused by a different lag structure of the 
respective Newey-West standard errors. The replication presents statistically 
significant risk premia for 14 hours in the total sample, whereas significant risk premia 
are reported for only 5 hours in the original study. An extension with prior data yields 
the result that more statistically significant risk premia are observed during weekdays 
than during weekends, in contrast to the findings of Viehmann (2011). Moreover, this 
extension provides some evidence that the reduced form of the model by Bessembinder 
and Lemmon (2002) might not accurately predict the outcome for risk premia in the 
German day-ahead market. Finally, the results of an econometric analysis suggest that 
the introduction of negative prices has led to a remarkable decrease in risk premia 
when compared to the period of a positive price regime. 
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The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the 
literature. Section 4.3 summarizes the dataset, the methodology, and the results of the 
replication study. Section 4.4 comprises the dataset, the empirical strategy, and the 
results of the extension with negative prices. Section 4.5 concludes. 
4.2 Literature review 
Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) develop an influential theoretical model that takes 
into account the non-storable nature of electricity in order to study the price formation 
of forward contracts. In their model, identical risk-averse producers and retailers are 
trading in a competitive spot market. Both parties can take forward positions (sell/buy 
electricity) as hedges to maximize their objective profit functions. The model predicts 
that risk premia tend to be higher if the expected demand increases. Moreover, 
Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) derive a reduced form of the model where the risk 
premium is negatively related to the variance of the spot price distribution and 
positively related to the skewness of the spot price distribution. Empirical studies 
provide mixed evidence concerning the predictions of Bessembinder and Lemmon’s 
(2002) model.  
Longstaff and Wang (2004) conduct an empirical analysis of the wholesale electricity 
market in Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and Maryland (PJM) from June 2000 to 
November 2002. They find evidence that risk premia vary throughout the day and can 
be either positive or negative. Their results also confirm that risk premia are negatively 
related to the variance of spot prices and positively related to the skewness of spot 
prices.  
Haugom and Ullrich (2012) revisit the empirical study of Longstaff and Wang (2004) 
and extend the observation period to December 2010. They find that the PJM market 
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became efficient over time, meaning that forward prices converged to unbiased 
predictors of subsequent spot prices. However, their results cannot confirm the reduced 
relationship of the model by Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002). Results of rolling 
regressions reveal highly unstable parameters for the variance and skewness during 
the observed period. 
Risk premia in the German day-ahead market are analyzed by Viehmann (2011) for 
the period October 2005 to September 2008. Interpreting the EXAA price as a snapshot 
of the continuous over the counter (OTC) market, the results of the empirical 
investigation suggest that market participants behave like risk-averse rational 
economic agents. They are willing to pay significant negative risk premia in periods 
of low demand and positive risk premia during peak hours.  
The impact of negative prices on risk premia, however, could not be investigated 
because the first negative price on the German day-ahead market occurred on October 
5, 2008. Viehmann (2011) concludes that the introduction of negative prices might 
decrease the skewness of the spot price distribution, which would lead to a negative 
impact on the risk premium. Due to the reduced skewness, traders would take fewer 
forward positions in order to hedge high power prices on the spot market. However, it 
must be noted that this argumentation is based on the reduced form of the model by 
Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002), which was designed to explain large electricity 
price spikes via higher variable costs of the respective conventional power plants and 
does not take into account the possibility of negative prices. The question of whether 
trading under a negative price regime affects the risk premium will be addressed in 
Section 4.4. 
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4.3 Replication of Viehmann (2011) and extension 
4.3.1 Data 
The dataset of the replication study is comprised of hourly day-ahead prices from the 
two power exchanges, EPEX and EXAA. For the exact replication of the study by 
Viehmann (2011), I use data from October 1, 2005 to September 30, 2008. Note, that 
in the last month of this period it would have been possible to trade at negative prices, 
since EPEX introduced negative price bids on September 1, 2008. However, this 
specific dataset contains only positive electricity prices because the first negative price 
on the EPEX occurred on October 5, 2008. The results of the descriptive statistics are 
identical to those published in Viehmann (2011) and are presented in the Appendix B 
(Tables B. 1 - B. 2). 
Table 4-1: Summary of hourly EPEX prices from March 22, 2002 to September 30, 2005 
       
Hour Mean Min Median Max Std. dev. Skewness 
1 22.26 3.68 21.82 53.92 7.85 0.49 
2 19.05 0.09 18.03 48.02 8.13 0.43 
3 17.26 0.00 16.42 43.31 8.04 0.37 
4 16.10 0.00 15.27 40.22 7.78 0.37 
5 16.44 0.00 16.67 39.65 7.70 0.33 
6 19.35 0.00 19.40 47.53 8.27 0.02 
7 23.31 0.00 24.92 60.09 10.95 -0.16 
8 31.40 0.00 33.02 250.02 16.48 2.45 
9 35.07 0.00 34.99 300.01 19.89 4.50 
10 37.50 0.16 36.07 258.16 18.50 3.23 
11 40.16 1.15 37.87 492.43 22.89 7.77 
12 48.80 1.92 40.33 500.01 37.14 4.85 
13 39.86 1.88 37.01 210.12 19.79 3.45 
14 37.63 1.03 35.88 189.92 18.53 2.64 
15 16.95 0.13 34.04 217.38 16.95 2.91 
16 32.42 0.00 32.17 150.22 13.95 1.19 
17 31.30 0.00 31.16 95.05 12.32 0.59 
18 33.54 0.00 32.25 180.07 14.15 1.97 
19 36.48 0.26 33.10 1719.72 49.70 30.33 
20 33.68 1.01 32.10 300.10 14.99 5.46 
21 32.70 2.27 31.92 150.08 11.59 1.54 
22 29.89 2.23 29.69 69.92 9.41 0.46 
23 28.91 4.53 28.35 53.87 8.73 0.60 
24 24.33 2.09 24.08 60.03 7.70 0.47 
All 30.10 0.00 28.17 1719.72 20.15 22.34 
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Table 4-2: Summary of hourly EXAA prices from March 22, 2002 to September 30, 2005 
       
Hour Mean Min Median Max Std. dev. Skewness 
1 22.12 4.45 21.67 51.70 7.50 0.52 
2 19.00 2.14 18.00 48.80 7.47 0.60 
3 17.22 1.90 16.00 45.00 7.28 0.55 
4 16.12 1.00 15.00 42.08 7.11 0.53 
5 16.39 1.00 15.36 40.00 7.14 0.48 
6 19.35 0.90 19.00 99.99 8.11 0.87 
7 23.87 0.01 25.10 72.50 10.29 -0.05 
8 31.06 0.44 33.00 137.71 14.04 0.54 
9 36.05 1.33 35.86 267.14 19.31 3.61 
10 38.25 3.00 37.00 333.89 19.99 4.76 
11 41.37 7.10 38.20 837.03 30.39 15.07 
12 48.84 8.96 41.00 600.00 37.19 6.08 
13 40.78 6.64 38.04 500.00 23.78 7.50 
14 38.45 6.67 37.00 304.82 20.53 4.21 
15 36.09 6.61 35.00 295.94 19.15 4.44 
16 33.96 4.32 33.50 246.40 16.16 3.20 
17 32.46 6.10 32.11 100.00 12.63 0.79 
18 34.47 5.00 33.14 136.36 13.67 1.22 
19 35.99 6.20 33.90 191.04 15.83 2.81 
20 34.38 8.10 32.51 200.50 14.00 3.53 
21 32.42 9.49 31.40 117.40 10.71 1.27 
22 29.81 7.98 29.60 80.00 9.13 0.54 
23 29.28 9.82 28.68 99.99 8.62 0.96 
24 25.09 6.70 24.41 60.01 7.51 0.59 
All 30.54 0.01 28.55 837.03 18.55 7.59 
 
Furthermore, this study extends the original research using data through March 22, 
2002 (i.e. the publication of the first EXAA price). The same institutional framework 
exists as in the replication period: EXAA auction results are published about two hours 
in advance (Zachmann, 2008). Table 4-1 and Table 4-2 provide new summary statistics 
for both power exchanges. As in the original study, prices at the EXAA are, on average, 
slightly higher than at the EPEX (30.54 €/MWh vs. 30.10 €/MWh), but there are 
significant differences in the descriptive statistics at the hourly level. The highest price 
at which electricity was traded at the EPEX was 1719.72 €/MWh, which is more than 
double the highest price recorded at the EXAA (837.03 €/MWh) during the same 
period.  
Statistics for the skewness reveal a new insight into the distributional properties of 
electricity prices under a positive price regime. Even though most of the contracts 
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exhibit a right-skewed distribution, there is a left-skewed distribution in hour 7 on both 
power exchanges. This is interesting insofar as the original study presents a strictly 
right-skewed distribution on both markets because of the convex shape of the power 
supply curve and the presence of power price spikes (Viehmann, 2011). However, the 
highest prices are much lower during the prior period than during the replication 
period, which might explain the left-skewness in hour 7 (EPEX: 60.09 €/MWh vs. 
94.51 €/MWh; EXAA: 72.50 €/MWh vs. 92.06 €/MWh). 
4.3.2 Measurement of risk premia  
Following Viehmann (2011) and Lazarczyk (2016), I use the ex-post approach with 
realized data of both power exchanges. Risk premia for individual hourly contracts are 
measured by OLS regressions: 
EXAA_price𝑖,𝑑 − EPEX_price𝑖,𝑑 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑑, 
(4.1) 
with i = 1, …, 24 and d = 1, …, N where N indicates the number of days in the sample 
and i the hours of the day; the error term 𝜀i,d is random noise and the constant 𝛼𝑖 
represents the mean risk premium for the hour i. The price difference between both 
power exchanges tends to be positive when the EXAA price is higher than the EPEX 
price and vice versa. As in the original study, all regressions are conducted with 
Newey-West standard errors. 
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4.3.3 Results 
Tables 4-3, 4-4, and 4-5 summarize the regression results of Equation (4.1) and present 
the respective t-statistics of the estimated constants. These tables contain the 
replication of the subsamples “All Days”, “Weekdays”, and “Weekends” of Table 3 in 
Viehmann (2011) as well as the estimated risk premia for the extension with prior 
years. All estimates of the mean hourly risk premium coincide with the original study. 
Minor deviations might be the result of rounding errors. 
In contrast, estimated Newey-West standard errors cannot be reproduced and lead to 
drastic changes in the reported significance levels. All t-values are calculated by the 
software EViews 9, which makes use of the optimal bandwidth selection algorithm of 
Newey and West (1994) in order to select the appropriate number of lags for the 
standard errors. To check whether the obtained differences might be caused due to 
another lag structure, I contacted the author of the original study. Viehmann states that 
he has used the R package “sandwich” from the year 2009 without any further lag 
specifications; hence, I re-estimated Equation (4.1) with R 3.4.2 including the latest 
version of the package “sandwich”. By default, the lag parameter is set to NULL which 
means that the optimal bandwidth selection process of Newey and West (1994) is used. 
I obtain the same results for the optimal bandwidth and, thus, the same standard errors 
as with EViews 9. Although not reported here, further estimates of risk premia with 
other Newey-West standard error specifications do not reproduce the original t-statistic 
either. I suspect that Viehmann might have used a different lag structure and/or Pre-
Whitening lags in the original study.  
While statistically significant risk premia are reported for only 5 hours in Viehmann 
(2011), my estimation results point to statistically significant risk premia for 14 hours 
in the total sample. On weekdays, the replication provides 10 significant hours in 
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comparison to the 5 significant hours in the original study. Negative significant risk 
premia are only observed on weekends during the hours 1-6. Overall, the replication 
results are in line with the conclusion of Viehmann (2011) that traders act like risk-
averse rational economic agents in the German day-ahead market for electricity. 
The extension with prior data under a positive price regime for the sample “All days” 
points to 14 hourly contracts where the risk premium is significantly different from 
zero. As in the original study, negative significant risk premia are only present on 
weekends. In contrast, there is evidence that the preceding years exhibit more 
significant risk premia during weekdays than during weekends (15 vs. 11). 
Furthermore, one would expect negative risk premia in hour 7 because of the left-
skewness of the power price distribution (Bessembinder and Lemmon, 2002). 
However, the regression results suggest a strictly positive significant risk premium for 
all subsamples. This contradiction may support the conclusions of Haugom and Ullrich 
(2012) that point to highly unstable signs for the parameters of the variance and 
skewness in the reduced form of the model by Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002). 
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Table 4-3: Tests of risk premia – Original results, replication and extension for all days 
a Excludes data from July 25, 2006. 
b Excludes data from November 7, 2006. 
t-statistics are based on Newey-West standard errors. 
Optimal Bandwidth for a Bartlett kernel was determined by the Newey-West method (Newey and 
West, 1994). 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
All days Viehmann (2011) Replication Mar. 22, 2002 – Sept. 30, 2005 
Hour Risk premium t-statistic Risk premium t-statistic Bandwidth Risk premium t-statistic Bandwidth 
1 0.08 0.28 0.08 0.50 4 -0.13 -1.32 11 
2 -0.39 -1.36 -0.39 -2.34** 10 -0.05 -0.54 5 
3 -0.48 -1.49 -0.48 -2.77*** 2 -0.05 -0.49 8 
4 -0.16 -0.39 -0.16 -0.82 9 0.02 0.19 4 
5 -0.07 -0.19 -0.07 -0.36 9 -0.06 -0.62 6 
6 -0.42 -1.15 -0.42 -2.36** 8 -0.01 -0.06 3 
7 0.52 1.04 0.52 2.12** 8 0.56 4.67*** 11 
8 0.81 0.88 0.81 2.11** 11 -0.35 -1.65* 15 
9 0.36 0.41 0.37 0.77 3 0.98 2.49** 17 
10 0.58 0.60 0.58 1.42 11 0.75 1.88* 7 
11 0.72 0.67 0.72 1.23 2 1.21 1.55 7 
12 -0.77 -0.22 -0.76 -0.48 6 0.02 0.02 10 
12aa 0.72 0.85 0.73 1.27 54    
13 0.55 0.56 0.55 1.19 13 0.92 1.78* 11 
14 0.42 0.42 0.42 1.02 22 0.82 2.04** 13 
15 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.39 22 1.23 3.67*** 9 
16 0.97 0.97 0.97 2.59*** 23 1.54 4.85*** 19 
17 1.95 1.98** 1.95 4.66*** 11 1.16 6.50*** 20 
18 3.52 2.61*** 3.52 4.91*** 6 0.92 4.11*** 19 
19 0.77 0.18 0.77 0.35 9 -0.50 -0.38 1 
19ab 2.88 1.55 2.88 3.11*** 5    
20 1.87 3.26*** 1.87 4.20*** 11 0.70 3.39*** 50 
21 0.58 1.15 0.58 2.24** 12 -0.27 -1.88* 19 
22 0.53 1.14 0.53 2.40** 13 -0.07 -0.61 15 
23 1.17 2.14** 1.17 4.27*** 18 0.37 3.16*** 5 
24 1.25 2.59*** 1.26 5.66*** 12 0.76 7.98*** 6 
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Table 4-4: Tests of risk premia – Original results, replication and extension for weekdays 
a Excludes data from July 25, 2006. 
b Excludes data from November 7, 2006. 
t-statistics are based on Newey-West standard errors. 
Optimal Bandwidth for a Bartlett kernel was determined by the Newey-West method (Newey and 
West, 1994). 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
Weekdays Viehmann (2011) Replication Mar. 22, 2002 – Sept. 30, 2005 
Hour Risk premium t-statistic Risk premium t-statistic Bandwidth Risk premium t-statistic Bandwidth 
1 0.42 1.24 0.42 2.63*** 6 -0.01 -0.13 9 
2 -0.13 -0.50 -0.13 -0.87 13 -0.05 -0.50 8 
3 -0.09 -0.30 -0.09 -0.58 13 0.03 0.30 11 
4 0.37 0.79 0.37 1.87* 3 0.18 1.73* 7 
5 0.32 0.84 0.32 1.70* 2 0.06 0.62 4 
6 -0.21 -0.58 -0.22 -1.13 10 -0.04 -0.28 9 
7 0.09 0.15 0.09 0.34 7 0.24 1.81* 13 
8 0.24 0.21 0.24 0.48 17 -0.95 -3.05*** 2 
9 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.24 1 1.04 1.88* 11 
10 0.61 0.53 0.61 1.09 42 0.98 1.81* 9 
11 0.81 0.53 0.81 1.42 42 1.78 1.60 8 
12 -1.27 -0.26 -1.27 -0.60 2 0.23 0.17 13 
12aa 0.82 0.73 0.82 1.11 33    
13 0.83 0.62 0.83 1.34 18 1.46 1.94* 12 
14 0.35 0.26 0.35 0.63 19 1.19 1.99** 15 
15 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 60 1.68 3.35*** 14 
16 0.93 0.71 0.93 2.78*** 151 2.01 4.40*** 16 
17 2.29 1.66* 2.29 3.59*** 14 1.48 6.45*** 17 
18 4.49 2.15** 4.49 4.29*** 8 1.27 4.76*** 11 
19 0.90 0.15 0.90 0.29 6 -0.66 -0.36 2 
19ab 3.86 1.25 3.86 2.94*** 9    
20 2.68 3.79*** 2.68 4.08*** 17 1.09 4.54*** 27 
21 0.32 0.60 0.32 1.12 11 -0.37 -2.26** 15 
22 0.42 0.84 0.42 1.63 11 -0.08 -0.57 16 
23 1.29 2.58*** 1.29 3.84*** 17 0.38 2.87*** 4 
24 1.27 2.63*** 1.27 5.16*** 16 0.68 7.27*** 8 
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Table 4-5: Tests of risk premia – Original results, replication and extension for weekends 
t-statistics are based on Newey-West standard errors. 
Optimal Bandwidth for a Bartlett kernel was determined by the Newey-West method (Newey and 
West, 1994). 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
 
  
Weekends Viehmann (2011) Replication Mar. 22, 2002 – Sept. 30, 2005 
Hour Risk premium t-statistic Risk premium t-statistic Bandwidth Risk premium t-statistic Bandwidth 
1 -0.74 -1.47 -0.74 -2.46** 10 -0.43 -2.39** 10 
2 -1.04 -1.74* -1.04 -3.03*** 9 -0.07 -0.36 16 
3 -1.46 -2.41** -1.46 -3.86*** 4 -0.25 -1.25 14 
4 -1.49 -2.18** -1.49 -3.88*** 7 -0.38 -2.16** 24 
5 -1.02 -1.6 -1.02 -2.91*** 2 -0.37 -1.95* 13 
6 -0.94 -1.48 -0.94 -2.46** 6 0.06 0.29 7 
7 1.58 1.73* 1.58 3.57*** 5 1.36 6.30*** 11 
8 2.22 3.04*** 2.22 5.12*** 2 1.16 5.20*** 8 
9 0.86 1.51 0.86 2.00** 6 0.84 3.99*** 8 
10 0.50 0.73 0.50 1.25 3 0.17 0.83 5 
11 0.50 0.68 0.50 1.47 8 -0.22 -1.06 9 
12 0.47 0.54 0.50 1.41 1 -0.52 -2.26** 3 
13 -0.16 -0.26 -0.14 -0.62 13 -0.42 -2.05** 8 
14 0.59 0.99 0.59 1.90* 10 -0.10 -0.52 11 
15 0.62 1.47 0.62 2.54** 14 0.08 0.46 6 
16 1.07 2.07** 1.07 3.40*** 2 0.35 1.73* 4 
17 1.10 1.98** 1.10 3.78*** 18 0.37 1.71* 5 
18 1.10 1.17 1.10 2.68*** 6 0.07 0.28 6 
19 0.46 0.55 0.46 1.10 8 -0.11 -0.43 4 
20 -0.14 -0.18 -0.14 -0.34 3 -0.28 -1.30 13 
21 1.20 1.42 1.20 2.97*** 6 -0.03 -0.12 4 
22 0.82 1.21 0.82 2.45** 7 -0.07 -0.34 10 
23 0.86 1.12 0.86 2.41** 5 0.35 1.59 4 
24 1.21 1.70* 1.21 2.98*** 11 0.94 5.40*** 12 
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4.4 Extension: The impact of negative electricity prices 
4.4.1 Data and evolution of risk premia 
Negative prices in the German day-ahead market are the result of a higher feed-in of 
RES in periods of low demand and/or interconnection failures. Market participants are 
willing to submit bids below variable costs in order to avoid ramping down base load 
power plants (Nicolosi, 2010; Fanone et al., 2013). Negative bids at the EPEX have 
been possible since September 1, 2008, whereas prices at the EXAA had to be positive 
until October 15, 2013. 
In order to take into account the changes in the price regimes, I extend the dataset to 
December 31, 2016. Hourly day-ahead electricity prices from the two power 
exchanges are summarized in Table 4-6 and Table 4-7. On average, prices on the 
EXAA market coincide with prices on the EPEX market (39.64 €/MWh vs. 39.43 
€/MWh), and there are no significant differences in the mean prices at the hourly level. 
Negative prices on the EPEX market occur during the whole day except between the 
hours 19-20 and at hour 23. There are no negative prices on the EXAA market during 
the hours 18-22. The lowest price was in the EPEX market with –500.02 €/MWh in 
comparison to –50.92 €/MWh on the EXAA market. The descriptive statistics 
summarize a right- as well as a left-skewed price distribution; hence, the threat of 
possible anti-spikes, especially during off-peak hours, might have a crucial impact on 
the formation of a risk premium. 
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Table 4-6: Summary of hourly EPEX prices from October 1, 2008 to December 31, 2016 
       
Hour Mean Min Median Max Std. dev Skewness 
1 31.72 -149.90 31.35 75.01 11.89 -2.46 
2 28.56 -200.00 28.99 65.80 13.39 -4.70 
3 26.19 -500.02 27.13 62.70 16.65 -12.93 
4 24.57 -221.94 25.41 60.80 14.16 -4.97 
5 25.05 -199.89 25.77 61.93 13.27 -4.23 
6 28.10 -199.00 28.82 70.51 12.97 -3.82 
7 34.58 -199.99 36.06 104.93 17.04 -3.18 
8 43.39 -199.94 43.94 183.49 20.45 -0.46 
9 46.44 -119.96 45.97 178.10 19.11 0.50 
10 46.74 -36.10 45.83 180.93 17.93 0.93 
11 46.24 -10.31 45.25 199.95 17.91 0.99 
12 46.77 -8.30 45.92 282.59 18.74 1.47 
13 44.22 -76.09 43.65 216.01 17.88 0.86 
14 41.77 -100.06 40.85 160.84 18.11 0.36 
15 39.90 -130.09 39.13 151.45 18.05 -0.06 
16 39.38 -100.00 39.02 142.27 16.91 0.08 
17 40.47 -76.00 39.77 134.78 16.59 0.53 
18 46.48 -4.20 44.18 494.26 20.72 4.47 
19 51.09 7.45 48.21 259.48 20.38 2.37 
20 50.89 2.16 48.76 299.09 17.62 2.24 
21 46.52 -1.58 45.06 194.62 14.14 1.44 
22 41.88 -3.35 40.93 118.93 11.36 0.59 
23 40.60 3.45 39.75 90.56 10.79 0.20 
24 34.64 -90.98 34.00 71.68 10.73 -0.97 
All 39.43 -500.02 38.06 494.26 18.30 0.07 
 
Table 4-7: Summary of hourly EXAA prices from October 1, 2008 to December 31, 2016 
       
Hour Mean Min Median Max Std. dev. Skewness 
1 31.65 -13.99 31.00 74.04 10.30 -0.11 
2 28.56 -28.97 28.37 65.48 10.48 -0.32 
3 26.23 -29.69 26.31 63.44 10.62 -0.40 
4 24.53 -29.84 24.71 61.03 10.61 -0.32 
5 24.82 -30.01 24.99 62.95 10.63 -0.28 
6 27.92 -34.98 28.08 71.48 11.07 -0.31 
7 34.94 -38.30 35.60 97.37 13.91 -0.30 
8 43.53 -25.01 43.75 142.10 18.48 0.45 
9 46.75 -8.28 46.53 158.00 18.38 0.69 
10 47.22 -4.00 46.50 170.84 17.36 0.88 
11 46.88 -4.87 46.00 158.00 17.19 0.96 
12 47.09 -1.50 46.00 180.03 17.80 1.06 
13 44.70 -14.90 43.97 163.35 17.19 0.88 
14 42.30 -24.42 41.45 153.07 17.11 0.76 
15 40.45 -45.68 39.91 145.00 16.71 0.66 
16 39.89 -50.92 39.30 146.50 15.98 0.60 
17 41.12 -24.84 39.96 135.25 16.21 0.86 
18 46.66 0.10 44.30 180.72 19.14 1.60 
19 51.17 10.01 48.30 213.49 19.74 1.89 
20 50.81 13.94 48.72 178.34 16.72 1.59 
21 46.78 1.52 45.48 137.15 13.68 1.29 
22 42.17 0.01 41.30 112.59 11.14 0.73 
23 40.36 -0.51 39.25 94.94 10.53 0.32 
24 34.72 -6.48 33.85 81.21 9.73 0.09 
All 39.64 -50.92 38.00 213.49 17.11 0.95 
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Figure 4-1 depicts the evolution of the risk premium for base contracts (i.e. the average 
of all hourly prices per day) over the total sample period. It summarizes the results of 
a rolling regression of the risk premium on the constant over an estimation window of 
365 days. On the one hand, there is evidence that the mean yearly risk premium 
exhibits a highly unstable pattern over time. On the other hand, this figure points to 
lower risk premia after the introduction of negative prices on both power exchanges.  
Appendix Table B. 3 summarizes estimates for risk premia during the period in which 
negative prices have been possible on at least one power exchange. Compared to the 
period of a positive regime, the hourly estimates tend to be lower during the period 
from September 6, 2008 to December 31, 2016. 
4.4.2 Empirical strategy 
In order to examine the relationship between risk premia and the introduction of 
negative prices, I conduct an econometric analysis including all data from 2002 to 
2016. For this purpose, I set the period where only EPEX prices could be negative as 
a reference and test the differences to other price regime periods for statistical 
significance: 
Risk_premium𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1Positive_period𝑡 + 𝛽2EXAA_policy𝑡 + 𝛾′𝐶𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡, 
 (4.2) 
with t = 1, …, N where N indicates the number of hours in the sample. The dummy 
variable “Positive period” is one from March 22, 2002 until September 1, 2005, and 
the dummy variable “EXAA policy” from October 16, 2013 until December 31, 2016. 
C is a vector of control variables as dummy variables for electricity price spikes, which 
become one if the prices exceed 500 €/MWh, and one if the prices become negative in 
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general. Furthermore, dummy variables for peak hours, weekend days, and months are 
included in order to take into account seasonal effects.  
As a robustness check, I replace the latter time-dummy variables by the actual German 
load as a proxy for demand (Longstaff and Wang, 2004; Graf and Wozabal, 2013). 
The load data in this study is provided by the European Network of Transmission 
System Operators for Electricity (ENTSO-E) Transparency Platform.9  
Since the beginning of 2010, electricity from RES must be sold directly on power 
exchanges because of an amendment to the German Renewable Energy Act (REA). 
This institutional change drastically increased the traded volumes on the day-ahead 
markets and could be an important driver for the occurrence of negative prices 
(Nicolosi, 2010; Bönte et al., 2015). I, therefore, include a dummy variable for the 
REA amendment that becomes one from the year 2010 onwards.  
The variables “Risk premium” and “Load” are checked for the presence of a unit root 
by performing several Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. The optimal numbers 
of lags were chosen by minimizing the Schwarz information criterion. The results of 
the unit root tests with and without a trend suggest that both variables are stationary 
(see Appendix Table B. 4). Following Clò and D’Adamo (2015), I consider serial 
correlation in the residuals and conduct a Prais-Winsten regression. In particular, 
Equation (4.2) is estimated with FGLS where the error term is assumed to follow a 
first-order autoregressive process: 
𝜀𝑡 = 𝜌𝜀𝑡−1 + 𝜔𝑡, 
 (4.3) 
                                                 
9 One might argue that residual load seems to be more relevant for the price formation than actual load 
(Pape et al., 2016). However, due to the lack of availability of reliable RES feed-in data from 2002-
2010, I decided to use the absolute level of load instead of the residual load. 
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where |ρ| < 1 and 𝜔 is white noise. All regressions are conducted with 
heteroscedasticity robust estimators for the variance-covariance matrix.  
4.4.3 Results 
The Prais-Winsten regression results are summarized in Table 4-8. The first column 
reports the estimated coefficients of a basic model without control variables for 
negative prices. The results suggest that the risk premium decreased significantly by  
–0.41 €/MWh after the introduction of negative EPEX prices and by –0.23 €/MWh 
after the introduction of negative EXAA prices.  
The second column of Table 4-8 presents regression results with two negative price 
dummies and an interaction term, the impact of negative EPEX prices after the regime 
switch on the EXAA. The regression results point to an increasing effect on the risk 
premium because of negative EPEX prices during the period of September 2, 2008 to 
October 15, 2013 (24.57 €/MWh). This effect diminishes by 14.33 €/MWh after the 
introduction of negative EXAA prices. In addition, negative EXAA prices cause a 
further decreasing effect on the risk premium (–2.95 €/MWh). These results remain 
robust after controlling for the amendment in the REA. 
The fourth column of Table 4-8 presents results where actual hourly load data (in 1,000 
MW) is included from January 1, 2006 onwards as a control variable. The regression 
results point to a positive significant impact of load on the risk premium. Note that the 
sample size reduces from 129,518 to 96,352 observations due to limited data 
availability in this model. As in the preceding models, the introduction of negative 
prices on the EPEX as well as on the EXAA market has a negative significant impact 
on the risk premium.  
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Table 4-8: Results of Prais-Winsten regressions 
 
 
Reference period September 2, 2008 to October 15, 2013. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Risk premium Risk premium Risk premium Risk premium 
     
Positive price period 0.405*** 0.516*** 0.823*** 0.887*** 
 (0.112) (0.106) (0.179) (0.228) 
EXAA policy change -0.228*** -0.202*** -0.311*** -0.270*** 
 (0.0697) (0.0597) (0.0589) (0.0573) 
Negative EPEX price  24.57*** 24.60*** 24.08*** 
  (3.245) (3.244) (3.186) 
Negative EXAA price  -2.952*** -2.955*** -2.735** 
  (1.072) (1.072) (1.073) 
EXAA policy change*Negative EPEX price  -14.33*** -14.36*** -14.01*** 
  (3.348) (3.346) (3.291) 
REA amendment   0.415** 0.257 
   (0.162) (0.167) 
Peak hours 0.527*** 0.589*** 0.589***  
 (0.0705) (0.0688) (0.0688)  
Weekend -0.206*** -0.277*** -0.277***  
 (0.0777) (0.0742) (0.0742)  
Load    0.0244*** 
    (0.00588) 
     
Dummies     
Month  Yes Yes Yes No 
Price spikes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant 0.0240 -0.0564 -0.352** -1.328*** 
 (0.100) (0.0961) (0.163) (0.337) 
     
Observations 129,518 129,518 129,518 96,352 
Adjusted R-squared 0.386 0.389 0.389 0.414 
     
Rho 0.493 0.482 0.482 0.496 
Durbin-Watson statistic (original) 1.088 1.125 1.126 1.128 
Durbin-Watson statistic (transformed) 2.165 2.161 2.161 2.155 
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Further OLS regressions with Newey-West standard errors confirm the sign and 
statistical significance of the variable “Positive price period” in all models (see 
Appendix Table B. 5). Likewise, as in the Prais-Winsten regression, the impact of the 
EXAA policy change is negative, although not statistically significant in the models 
without the REA dummy. Taking all results into consideration, the introduction of 
negative prices has a diminishing effect on the risk premium, as Viehmann (2011) 
expected. 
4.5 Conclusion 
Replicating the results of Viehmann (2011), this paper confirms the presence of risk 
premia in the German day-ahead electricity market. While estimates of mean hourly 
risk premia can be replicated, this paper fails to reproduce respective Newey-West 
standard errors, leading to remarkable differences between the reported significance 
levels. Using optimal bandwidth selection for a Bartlett kernel, I find statistically 
significant risk premia for 14 hours in the total sample, whereas significant risk premia 
are reported for only 5 hours in the original study. An empirical extension with data of 
preceding years points to further differences with respect to size and statistical 
significance. 
Going beyond the results in Viehmann (2011), this study considers the impact of 
negative prices on risk premia. The results of an econometric analysis suggest that the 
introduction of negative prices on the EPEX in September 2008 as well as on the 
EXAA market in October 2013 reduced the risk premia remarkably when compared 
to a period with positive prices on both power exchanges. This is in line with the 
expectations of the original paper. Since negative prices reduce the skewness of the 
spot price distribution, market participants tend to take less forward positions as a 
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hedge against high spot prices. Future empirical studies should take into account the 
question of whether negative electricity prices are possible in the market and adjust 
the model accordingly.  
The implementation of negative electricity prices in the model presented by 
Bessembinder and Lemmon (2002) may be an interesting subject for further research. 
One must consider that negative prices can occur through shocks on the supply side as 
well as the demand side, thus the model would need to take into account renewable 
energy sources as electricity production technologies in the supply curve. 
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Appendix B 
Table B. 1: Summary of hourly EPEX prices from October 1, 2005 to September 30, 2008 
       
Hour Mean Min Median Max Std. dev. Skewness 
1 36.89 1.64 34.29 76.02 14.11 0.52 
2 32.03 0.00 29.96 71.07 13.46 0.45 
3 28.65 0.00 27.12 67.93 12.88 0.39 
4 25.73 0.00 23.99 69.52 12.55 0.39 
5 26.06 0.00 24.06 69.92 12.43 0.38 
6 31.61 0.00 30.29 70.28 13.82 0.23 
7 36.63 0.00 34.80 94.51 19.89 0.18 
8 53.11 0.00 51.14 301.01 30.72 1.25 
9 59.44 0.00 55.70 437.26 33.45 2.34 
10 64.60 0.00 59.85 499.68 36.47 3.16 
11 68.54 0.00 62.68 998.24 44.65 9.09 
12 77.05 5.56 68.01 2000.07 81.64 16.14 
12aa 75.29 5.56 68.00 1399.99 57.33 12.23 
13 67.08 6.96 63.03 699.81 37.94 6.45 
14 63.57 2.65 59.17 699.88 37.12 6.31 
15 59.98 0.07 55.04 800.09 37.83 7.76 
16 56.04 0.12 51.57 693.23 34.21 6.80 
17 54.70 3.86 50.15 300.01 29.60 2.27 
18 61.84 6.90 54.07 821.90 49.03 7.11 
19 67.54 15.95 59.11 2436.63 86.50 19.87 
19ab 65.38 15.95 59.07 701.01 48.52 6.39 
20 60.00 17.97 57.06 250.04 27.75 1.78 
21 55.21 15.07 53.23 125.02 21.43 0.49 
22 48.61 13.48 46.32 105.93 17.92 0.49 
23 46.93 14.65 44.26 94.82 16.58 0.47 
24 38.23 1.61 35.28 80.98 14.22 0.58 
All 50.84 0.00 44.62 2436.63 39.28 18.07 
 
a Excludes data from July 25, 2006. 
b Excludes data from November 7, 2006. 
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Table B. 2: Summary of hourly EXAA prices from October 1, 2005 to September 30, 2008 
       
Hour Mean Min Median Max Std. dev. Skewness 
1 36.97 6.83 35.01 81.00 13.38 0.51 
2 31.64 0.55 29.81 68.53 12.46 0.54 
3 28.17 0.01 26.45 65.64 11.84 0.53 
4 25.57 0.01 23.59 75.00 11.49 0.63 
5 26.00 0.01 24.15 62.50 11.56 0.54 
6 31.19 0.01 30.21 70.30 13.24 0.27 
7 37.14 0.01 36.58 92.06 18.62 0.21 
8 53.92 0.01 51.15 208.21 29.03 0.80 
9 59.81 0.01 57.54 205.00 29.52 0.82 
10 65.18 11.00 61.68 376.93 33.25 2.21 
11 69.26 11.67 65.00 459.46 35.88 2.82 
12 76.29 0.07 69.85 888.00 49.48 6.95 
13 67.64 20.60 63.97 458.89 33.86 3.78 
14 63.99 17.00 60.95 409.65 31.87 2.75 
15 60.16 3.51 57.07 350.00 30.85 2.41 
16 57.02 11.27 54.05 300.00 28.87 1.88 
17 56.65 9.83 52.06 240.00 28.97 1.49 
18 65.36 12.68 55.59 517.55 47.92 4.09 
19 68.31 17.60 60.01 519.93 46.63 3.88 
20 61.87 20.00 59.00 302.37 28.95 1.72 
21 55.78 19.40 54.94 127.78 20.69 0.49 
22 49.15 9.99 47.00 100.57 17.02 0.44 
23 48.10 1.00 45.73 90.00 16.47 0.36 
24 39.48 1.00 37.71 84.27 14.28 0.48 
All 51.45 0.01 45.07 888.00 32.07 3.76 
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Table B. 3: Tests of risk premia from September 6, 2008 to December 31, 2016 
t-statistics are based on Newey-West standard errors. 
Optimal Bandwidth for a Bartlett kernel was determined by the Newey-West method (Newey and 
West, 1994). 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table B. 4: Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for unit root 
   
Variables ADF test statistic  ADF test statistic with trend 
Risk premium -45.135*** -45.159*** 
Load -25.803*** -25.884*** 
   
Automatic lag selection: Schwarz information criterion. 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
  
 All days Weekdays Weekends 
Hour 
Risk 
premium t-statistic Bandwidth 
Risk 
premium t-statistic Bandwidth 
Risk 
premium t-statistic Bandwidth 
1 -0.07 -0.53 15 0.12 0.83 3 -0.57 -2.34** 12 
2 0.00 -0.02 11 0.06 0.28 4 -0.16 -0.61 6 
3 0.04 0.16 14 0.00 -0.01 4 0.14 0.23 5 
4 -0.02 -0.11 8 0.21 0.76 10 -0.60 -2.33** 14 
5 -0.22 -1.28 13 0.01 0.05 9 -0.80 -3.13*** 12 
6 -0.19 -1.13 6 -0.06 -0.32 8 -0.50 -1.86* 4 
7 0.36 1.95* 3 -0.02 -0.10 10 1.31 3.48*** 9 
8 0.12 0.78 7 -0.30 -1.69* 13 1.16 3.74*** 8 
9 0.32 2.87*** 13 0.24 2.00** 3 0.53 2.16** 5 
10 0.49 5.35*** 11 0.50 5.17*** 18 0.48 2.52** 4 
11 0.66 7.24*** 20 0.56 5.90*** 26 0.89 5.10*** 6 
12 0.35 3.18*** 18 0.23 1.90* 22 0.63 3.44*** 1 
13 0.51 4.93*** 26 0.43 3.87*** 23 0.71 3.31*** 5 
14 0.55 5.15*** 24 0.29 2.90*** 17 1.21 4.71*** 1 
15 0.57 5.27*** 21 0.28 2.87*** 19 1.29 4.94*** 11 
16 0.53 5.13*** 22 0.32 3.59*** 11 1.05 4.48*** 13 
17 0.67 6.84*** 4 0.61 6.46*** 4 0.85 3.71*** 2 
18 0.22 1.70* 29 0.22 1.47 38 0.21 1.10 10 
19 0.11 0.92 32 0.25 1.81* 22 -0.23 -1.23 3 
20 -0.09 -0.56 23 0.05 0.27 17 -0.43 -1.92* 15 
21 0.25 2.05** 22 0.09 0.82 5 0.65 2.49** 17 
22 0.30 2.79*** 22 0.17 1.76* 9 0.63 2.92*** 17 
23 -0.22 -2.16** 14 -0.18 -1.76* 12 -0.33 -1.61 13 
24 0.10 0.90 6 0.08 0.64 7 0.17 0.90 6 
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Table B. 5: Robustness - OLS regressions results 
 
 
Reference period September 2, 2008 to October 15, 2013. 
Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. 
Optimal Bandwidth for a Bartlett kernel was determined by the Newey-West method (Newey and 
West, 1994). 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Risk premium Risk premium Risk premium Risk premium 
     
Positive price period 0.364** 0.559*** 0.921*** 0.921*** 
 (0.166) (0.148) (0.276) (0.312) 
EXAA policy change -0.228 -0.149 -0.277** -0.248** 
 (0.159) (0.124) (0.131) (0.126) 
Negative EPEX price  42.87*** 42.94*** 43.20*** 
  (11.08) (11.07) (11.22) 
Negative EXAA price  -7.159*** -7.165*** -6.952*** 
  (2.175) (2.176) (2.167) 
EXAA policy change*Negative EPEX price  -26.55** -26.63** -26.81** 
  (11.26) (11.24) (11.40) 
REA amendment   0.487* 0.331 
   (0.284) (0.281) 
Peak hours 0.630*** 0.739*** 0.739***  
 (0.102) (0.0912) (0.0912)  
Weekend -0.177 -0.309** -0.310**  
 (0.135) (0.128) (0.129)  
Load    0.0318*** 
    (0.00726) 
     
Dummies     
Month  Yes Yes Yes No 
Price spikes  Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant 0.0240 -0.0564 -0.352** -1.328*** 
 (0.100) (0.0961) (0.163) (0.337) 
     
Observations 129,518 129,518 129,518 96,352 
Adjusted R-squared 0.339 0.356 0.356 0.363 
Bandwidth 142 140 145 120 
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5 Asymmetric information in the German intraday 
electricity market 
5.1 Introduction 
An example of asymmetric information between participants in electricity markets is 
knowledge of an unplanned power plant outage (von der Fehr, 2013). Since missing 
production leads to a shortage of supply, the electricity price during that outage 
increases, ceteris paribus. Non-disclosure, or disclosure with a time lag, of this missing 
production may save the insider additional costs, since market participants cannot use 
this information to adapt their biddings strategically and participate in the increased 
buying intention. The abuse of private information in order to influence the electricity 
spot price is investigated for the German day-ahead market, where participants have 
an incentive to withhold capacities (Weigt and von Hirschhausen, 2008; Bergler et al., 
2017). However, variations of the subsequent intraday price from the day-ahead price 
are only analyzed from a fundamental perspective (Hagemann, 2015b; Pape et al., 
2016).  
This paper investigates how private and public information about unplanned power 
plant outages impact the European Power Exchange (EPEX) volume weighted average 
intraday electricity price in Germany. It follows the study by Lazarczyk (2016), in 
which messages about unexpected outages are used to proxy public information, and 
introduces a method to measure the impact of private information on intraday prices. 
For this purpose, we use messages concerning unscheduled power plant non-usabilities 
that are published online at the European Energy Exchange (EEX) transparency 
platform. We assign the content of these messages into private and public information 
about the outages and test whether they explain the average intraday price in addition 
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to market fundamentals such as forecast errors of renewable energy sources (RES), 
load forecast errors and cross-border flows.  
The results of an econometric analysis point to a significant positive impact of private 
and public information about unplanned power plant outages on the intraday electricity 
price during 2014 to 2016. In July 2015, to provide market participants more 
adjustment possibilities to actively balance their portfolios in close-to-real time, the 
EPEX reduced the lead time from 45 minutes to 30 minutes for trading on the 
continuous intraday market. We show that the policy change enhances the possibilities 
of traders reacting to unplanned non-usabilities: an increased impact of private 
information on the electricity price is observed. Furthermore, the lead time change 
enables us to provide evidence for an asymmetric impact of private and public 
information on the intraday price.   
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses the 
impact of asymmetric information about unplanned power plant outages on the 
intraday price. Section 5.3 introduces the respective spot markets and their regulatory 
framework. The data of this study and the empirical strategy are presented in Section 
5.4 and Section 5.5, respectively. Section 5.6 contains the results and Section 5.7 
concludes. 
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5.2 Asymmetric information about unplanned power plant 
outages 
The impact of information on price building and trading on financial markets is studied 
within market microstructure literature (Madhavan, 2000). For instance, Kyle (1985) 
develops an influential model where a single trader with monopolistic information 
places orders over time to maximize trading profit before the information becomes 
public knowledge. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) analyze the strategic timing of trades 
and its impact on price evolution. Informed traders or insiders exploit their 
informational monopoly, which only becomes public information one trading period 
later, thus maximizing their profits by executing the trades one period in advance. This 
leads to a price adjustment revealing patterns of volume and price variability in the 
preannouncement period. 
An example of private information about electricity markets is knowledge of a power 
plant’s non-usability. Missing production leads to a shortage of supply, but other 
market participants are not able to adjust their bidding strategy if this information is 
not published or is published with a time lag, which provides the insider a temporal 
advantage. According to European Commission objectives, the various national 
markets should be integrated to facilitate the flow of electricity between the different 
European jurisdictions. Because respective arrangements and mechanisms such as 
market coupling in the day-ahead market and the intraday cross-border trading rely on 
trustworthy price signals, electricity markets should operate with an unbiased 
information set that reflects the supply- and demand-side fundamentals and is not 
distorted by an abuse of market power.  
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Bergler et al. (2017) investigate how the German day-ahead market is impacted by a 
strategic capacity withholding on prices. The study analyzes whether market 
participants are withholding capacities through failures in order to influence the 
auction price. By using data of the EEX transparency platform, the results of an 
empirical analysis indicate a positive influence of prices on power plant non-
usabilities. This implies that strategic capacity withholding, and thus an abuse of 
private information, takes place on the day-ahead market. 
Hagemann (2015b) analyzes price determinants in the German continuous intraday 
market. The study takes into account how unplanned power plant outages, forecast 
errors of RES, load forecast errors and cross-border physical flows impact intraday 
prices. The results suggest that supply-side shocks influence intraday prices differently 
during a day. Since missing production leads to a shortage of supply, the average price 
of the affected contracts increases. 
Lazarczyk (2015) analyzes the behavior of prices, number of trades and traded 
volumes in the period of one hour prior to the publication of market messages on the 
Nordic intraday market. The results point to positive effects on prices through an 
increase in the number of news reports in the preannouncement period, indicating that 
private information may be used for trading before the content of these messages 
becomes public information. 
Lazarczyk (2016) investigates how public information about non-usabilities impacts 
electricity prices for the Nordic continuous intraday market. The dataset of the study 
comprises messages providing information about unscheduled power plant outages 
that were issued between the bidding periods for the day-ahead and intraday markets. 
Hence, news announcing failures can only influence decisions concerning the intraday 
market. The results of an empirical analysis point to a significant positive effect of the 
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number of news reports on the intraday price. However, the magnitude of this effect 
varies within the day and tends to be observed for news concerning changes in 
marginal production during peak hours, whereas the impact of news concerning 
changes in baseload production is observed even in off-peak hours.  
These studies show that an unforeseen reduction in production, or even its 
announcement, leads to positive effects on the realized intraday price. The opportunity 
to trade with private information on a continuous intraday market arises if the time lag 
between the actual outage and its publication exceeds at least one tradable contract and 
provides the insider with a timely edge. The theoretical consideration in this paper is 
therefore twofold: Firstly, we assume that the involved power plant sold its production 
on the day-ahead market and is now obligated to deliver. Secondly, the power plant 
will not hedge its missing production against any schedule deviation penalties. Taking 
this into account, the trading responsible will now optimize its schedule deviations 
under technically feasible and economically efficient restrictions. In the very short run, 
these deviations may be voluntarily cross traded within a trader’s own portfolio, if 
available, by launching highly flexible generation units. Furthermore, optional reserve 
contracts on a bilateral basis may be activated to substitute the missing production, 
which is especially the case for large-scale power generation. Finally, depending on 
the outage duration, the trading responsible may compensate the deviations on the 
continuous intraday market. Since the marginal costs of claimed or counterparty 
generation are higher than the realized spot prizes, trading on the intraday market could 
be advantageous (Hagemann and Weber, 2013). Even if the affected power plant 
executes a bilateral or over the counter (OTC) trade, the counterparty will hedge its 
production on the intraday market, as it seems irrational to set aside the necessary 
capacities.  
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5.3 The short-term electricity markets in Germany 
5.3.1 The legal framework 
The reliability of wholesale energy market places, such as energy exchanges or OTC 
markets, depends not least on whether market participants consider the underlying 
price formation trustworthy and are willing to trade on them. To foster this rationale, 
the European Commission introduced a set of regulations, among which is Regulation 
(EU) No. 1227/2011 on Wholesale Energy Market Integrity and Transparency 
(REMIT), which has been in force since December 2011 in all EU member states. Its 
key objective is to ensure competition in wholesale energy markets. In terms of 
integrity, the regulation should build confidence that the wholesale price formation is 
reflected by market fundamentals and that no profits are gained through insider trading 
or market manipulation. In terms of transparency, the regulation should allow all 
stakeholders to have a clear picture of the market situation by making all relevant 
market and fundamental data publicly available (EU, 2011; EU, 2013).  
One main aim of REMIT is the prohibition of insider trading. This means that persons 
who possess inside information are prohibited from using this information to buy or 
sell wholesale energy products, e.g., electricity, or from “whispering” this information 
to any other person and recommending that they trade on this information. According 
to REMIT, the Agency for Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) is responsible 
for introducing a monitoring framework to detect and prevent market abuse. This 
implies access to records of transactions as well as data on capacity and use of facilities 
for production or transmission of electricity. Consequently, market participants as 
producers or traders are required to provide that information to ACER. Furthermore, 
ACER issues guidance to ensure that National Regulatory Authorities enforce their 
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tasks, derived from REMIT, in national legislation (ACER, 2016). In Germany, the 
legislator equipped the Bundesnetzagentur, through the Energy Industry Act (EnWG), 
with the necessary investigative and enforcement powers. The EnWG distinguishes 
between various sanctions. Violations can be classified as administrative or even as 
criminal offenses.  
REMIT requires all market participants to disclose inside information. Following 
Article 2(1) of REMIT, the concept of inside information includes all types of 
information that are likely to have a significant impact on prices of wholesale energy 
products. The obligation to disclose inside information lies with the market participant 
in accordance with Article 4(1), which is crucial for the scope of this study. According 
to Article 4(1) of REMIT,  
“Market participants shall publicly disclose in an effective and timely manner inside 
information […] relevant to the capacity and use of facilities for production […], 
including planned or unplanned unavailability of these facilities” (ACER 2016, p.41). 
In the context of registration, the market participants must specify where they publish 
their inside information. Because inside information should be spread as wide and 
publicly as possible to ensure equal and free of charge access, central platforms 
aggregating this information are considered effective. The EEX offers the publication 
of inside information via its transparency platform, which is supported by ACER. The 
notion of timely disclosure does not refer to a specific threshold, which can be 
measured in time units, but in combination with Articles 4(2) and 4(4) of REMIT, it 
prohibits any trading on this issue before this information is published in a 
simultaneous, complete and effective manner. Furthermore, it is up to market 
participants to decide whether information they hold constitutes inside information and 
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should be published. Consequently, any change of planned or unplanned production 
has to be disclosed if the criteria in Article 2(1) of REMIT are violated.   
Following REMIT, the impact of an unplanned power plant outage on the electricity 
price should not deviate from the impact of outage announcement, since trading on 
private information contradicts the purpose of this regulation. Hence, the duration of 
the time lag between the event and its publication should be irrelevant, since no 
information gains can be accumulated. Consequently, private information about 
unplanned power plant outages should not have an impact on intraday prices. 
5.3.2 Market framework 
Short-term electricity trading is based on the day-ahead and the intraday market. Both 
markets are characterized by physical fulfilment. In the day-ahead market, the 
participants have the option to trade (sell or buy) electricity for delivery in an 
anonymous auction or OTC for the next day. The EPEX hosts the auction and intraday 
trading platform, where standardized contracts can be executed. In contrast, OTC is a 
decentralized market, where market participants also negotiate bilaterally non-
standard contracts (Bönte et al., 2015).  
Concerning the day-ahead auction, orders contain up to 256 price/quantity 
combinations for each hour of the following day and must be submitted in the EPEX 
trading system by at least 12 pm (gate closure). The auction takes place daily after gate 
closure including statutory holidays. The determination of auction prices and 
quantities is realized by an algorithm, which sorts all sell and buy orders (offers and 
bids) in a price/quantity combination by increasing prices. Hence, for each hour a 
supply (merit-order) and demand curve is generated, and its intersection determines 
the market-clearing price. Under this uniform pricing, the optimal strategy for auction 
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participants is to bid at marginal costs. On the one hand, the short-term nature of the 
day-ahead market satisfies the trading of reliable forecasts of RES or unexpected peak 
demands. On the other hand, it suits the grid system characteristics, which require 
balanced supply and demand in advance.  
After gate closure, the market participants are offered to adjust their day-ahead 
schedules, if necessary, on the intraday market. Moreover, the participants are obliged 
by the regulator to reschedule, since the original day-ahead scheduling is affected by 
an unforeseen event, such as an unplanned outage. Any deviation from planned 
production may lead to imbalance costs which are penalized accordingly to the 
originator. Following the current balancing costs regime in Germany, imbalance prices 
significantly exceed – at least on average – the intraday prices.  Therefore, the expected 
imbalance costs incentivize all market participants to reduce imbalance volumes and 
can be considered as the main motivation for intraday trading (Scharff and Amelin, 
2016). 
On the continuous intraday market, electricity is traded for delivery on the same or on 
the following day on single hours. Each hour can be traded until 30 minutes before 
delivery begins. Starting at 3 pm on the current day, all hours of the following day can 
be traded. Trading is continuous 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Unlike the day-ahead 
auction market, prices on the continuous intraday market are determined by the pay-
as-you-bid principle, which implies trade matching at any time whenever the 
counterparty accepts the offer. Hence, prices vary from trade to trade and market 
participants may generate incremental rents by modifying their orders. Alternatively, 
intraday trading can also be executed in an OTC environment. However, as Zachmann 
(2008) and Nicolosi (2010) derive, OTC and exchange prices converge, otherwise 
arbitrage between these two markets would be possible. 
85 
5.3.3 Reduction of the lead time on the continuous intraday market 
To facilitate the producer’s need for rescheduling, EPEX shortened the lead time for 
contracts on the intraday market from 45 to 30 minutes till delivery on July 16, 2015.  
The lead time refers to the minimum time between the execution of a trade and the 
delivery of the traded electricity and its reduction is the object of an ongoing process. 
This structural change was introduced to manage emerging flexibility challenges of 
power markets more efficiently, which is particularly necessary for unforeseen events 
such as power plant outages but even more so for renewable forecast errors (EPEX 
SPOT SE, 2015). Since forecasts for RES can be set up nowadays in a constant update 
regime, the shorter lead time trading outcome is twofold. Firstly, the correcting trading 
quantities for the market participants decrease and relax, ceteris paribus, the impact on 
the intraday price. Secondly, which is a consequence of the first point, the reduction 
mitigates the imbalance costs especially associated with increased amounts of 
fluctuating renewable energy (Holttinen, 2005; Barth et al., 2008). Furthermore, the 
lead time reduction enables the market participants to arbitrage between neighboring 
countries, provides opportunities for cross-border trading and enhancing the reaction 
on load deviations (Weber, 2010; Viehmann, 2017).  
Concerning private information about unplanned power plant outages, the regime 
change may also create constellations, which enhance or limit the timely edge to trade 
on the continuous intraday market. According to the example in Figure 5-1, the 
unplanned outage starts at 15:20 and is published at 15:40. In the old regime, both the 
insider and the market participants can adjust their bids until 16:15 and, therefore, at 
the earliest for H18, which lasts from 17:00 to 18:00. Consequently, the information 
gain is omitted. In the new regime, the insider may trade contract H17, which lasts 
from 16:00 to 17:00, until 15:30 and benefit from the non-disclosure of this 
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information, since the market participants can only adjust their biddings for H18 until 
16:30. Overall, the publication time lag creates a situation for potential insider trading, 
which is strictly prohibited by the REMIT legislation. 
Nevertheless, the lead time regime change allows possible constellations that even 
limit the insider opportunity. According to the example in Figure 5-2, the outage starts 
at 15:20 and is published at 16:20. In the old regime, the insider obtains the information 
gain for two tradable contracts, H17 and H18, since the market participants can only 
react for H19 until 17:15. In the new regime, the lead time shortage enables the market 
to already react for H18 until 16:30. 
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5.4 Data 
5.4.1 Dependent variable: The difference between the day-ahead and 
intraday price 
Supply side shocks after the day-ahead gate closure cause open positions in the 
schedules of market participants and may induce trading activity on the continuous 
intraday market. Thus, the deviation of the volume weighted average intraday ID price 
from the day-ahead DA price can be explained by changes in the market fundamentals 
(Hagemann, 2015b) or by the publication of market messages (Lazarczyk, 2016).  
Table 5-1 sizes descriptive statistics of the EPEX day-ahead and intraday continuous 
prices, respectively. Our dataset begins on January 1, 2014 and ends on December 31, 
2016. On average, prices on the day-ahead market coincide with prices on the intraday 
market (31.12 €/MWh vs. 31.32 €/MWh), and there are no significant differences in 
the mean prices at the hourly level. However, the standard deviation on the day-ahead 
market is lower than on the intraday market (12.74 €/MWh vs. 13.81 €/MWh). At the 
hourly level, prices are less volatile on the day-ahead market during the hours 1–6 
when the demand is relatively low. They exhibit standard deviations between 8.08 and 
9.16 €/MWh. Electricity is traded for the highest price on the day-ahead market with 
104.96 €/MWh; this is much less than the largest price on the intraday market with 
139.12 €/MWh.  
Negative electricity prices on the German day-ahead market have been possible since 
2008. They are the result of a high feed-in of RES in periods of low demand and/or 
interconnections failures (Valitov, 2018). Negative prices are also possible on the 
intraday market. The lowest price in our dataset was on the intraday market with  
–155.52 €/MWh in comparison with –130.09 €/MWh on the day-ahead market. 
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5.4.2 Publication of unplanned power plant outages 
The EEX transparency platform publishes all unscheduled power plant non-
availabilities. Every planned and unplanned non-usability of 100 MW or more and of 
at least one hour in duration has to be reported by the power plant operator. The 
classification as a planned or unplanned non-usability depends on the time lag between 
the start of the outage and its reporting time. In case the message is issued before or 
simultaneously with the outage, it is classified as planned. In contrast, the message is 
classified as unplanned if the publication time stamp is after the beginning. Although 
not legally defined, news announcing failures has to be reported within 60 minutes of 
an outage. All messages are published online and can be updated on an on-going basis.  
Table 5-2: Descriptive statistics of published unplanned missing capacities (in MW) 
 
 Number Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Total sample 3,481 316.62 218.25 100 1,402 
45 minutes of lead time 1,552 318.41 225.46 100 1,310 
30 minutes of lead time 1,929 315.18 212.32 100 1,402 
 
Our dataset is comprised of market messages regarding unplanned outages, including 
information about the respective power plant type, the duration and magnitude of the 
non-usability and its publication timestamp. From the entire dataset, we segregate 
messages about outages of less than 100 MW and less than one hour in duration 
because facility operators are obliged to report only unplanned non-usabilities of 100 
MW or more that last at least one hour. This leaves 3,481 published messages about 
unplanned non-usabilities from 2014 to 2016. As summarized in Table 5-2, the mean 
missing capacity of an outage is about 317 MW. 
Next, we assign the content of the messages into two distinct explanatory variables: 
Private Information and Public Information. “Private Information” is the sum of 
missing capacities that may influence the intraday price only in the period from the 
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beginning of the outage until its publication on the EEX Transparency Platform. 
Consequently, all missing capacities that may have an impact on the intraday price 
from the publication timestamp until the expected end of the outage are summarized 
in the variable “Public Information.” 
5.4.3 Control variables: Renewable energies, load and cross-border 
physical flows 
Hagemann (2015b) discusses further determinants of the German intraday price. 
Besides unplanned power plant outages, RES forecast errors and load forecast errors 
as well as cross-border physical flows might influence the intraday price. Forecast 
errors are calculated as the difference between the actual value and the day-ahead 
forecasted value. Concerning the case of RES, TSOs might act as a seller of electricity 
on the intraday market if the actual generation exceeds the forecasted generation. Thus, 
an increase of the RES forecast error should lead, ceteris paribus, to a decrease of the 
intraday price. In contrast, TSOs might also act as a buyer of electricity on the intraday 
market if the actual consumption (load) is higher than the forecasted values. 
Furthermore, cross-border trades may influence the continuous intraday price. 
Electricity imports into the German intraday market are expected to decrease the 
prices, whereas exports to neighboring countries are expected to increase the prices. 
We control for these market fundamentals and include data provided by the European 
Network of Transmission System operators for electricity (ENTSO-E) Transparency 
Platform. In our analysis, we use generation data from wind (onshore and offshore) 
farms as well as solar plants. Cross-border flows are estimated by net exports from 
Germany to France (Hagemann, 2015b). 
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5.5 Empirical strategy 
Following Hagemann (2015b) and Lazarczyk (2016), we perform OLS regressions: 
ID_price𝑡 − DA_price𝑡
= 𝛼 + 𝛽1Private_information𝑡 + 𝛽2Public_information𝑡
+ 𝛾′𝐶𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡, 
(5.1) 
with t = 1, …, N where N indicates the number of hours in the sample. The difference 
between the average intraday price and the day-ahead price is regressed on the missing 
capacities caused through unplanned power plant outages. As described above, we 
distinguish between private and public information about the non-usabilities. 
Furthermore, the regressions include a vector of control variables C as described in 
Section 5.4.3, as well as dummy variables for hours, days, and months to control for 
time-specific effects. Note that all explanatory variables may influence the intraday 
price at hour t, but have no impact on the respective day-ahead price.  
As explained in Section 5.4.2, we assign the content of the market messages into two 
distinct explanatory variables: Private Information and Public Information. From these 
messages, we choose outages that arrive in time to influence decisions concerning the 
intraday market, but not the day-ahead market. This leaves 2,909 published unexpected 
outages with content that could possibly influence intraday prices from 2014 to 2016. 
From these 2,909 messages, we identify 705 messages for which the publication time 
lag creates opportunities to trade on private information. Table 5-3 summarizes the 
respective descriptive statistics of these messages. 
Since the lead time change creates situations that can enhance or limit the number of 
affected prices through power plant outages, we split the sample into periods before 
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and after the regime switch. Next, we segregate the messages in the 30 min lead time 
regime into four further categories—No change in private and public information, No 
change in private information, Increase in private information, and Decrease in 
private information—and assign public and private information, respectively.  
No change in private and public information means that the regime switch does not 
affect the number of influenced intraday prices due to an unplanned power plant 
outage. Hence, the outcome of these variables is comparable to the outcome of the 
variables in the 45 min subsample. Increase in private information includes all 
messages that increase the number of affected intraday prices due to private 
information compared to a 45 min regime. Decrease in private information means the 
opposite.  
Table 5-3: Market messages with potential impact on intraday prices (in MW) 
 
   Number Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
Total sample  All messages 2,909 320.86 222.42 100 1,402 
  Private information 705 327.37 226.09 100 1,050 
        
        
45 minutes of lead time  All messages 1,403 323.05 229.05 100 1,310 
  Private information 412 327.98 235.91 100 1,050 
        
        
30 minutes of lead time  All messages 1,506 318.82 216.12 100 1,402 
  Private information 293 326.51 211.89 100 915 
        
No change in private and  
public information All messages 965 327.13 220.02 100 1,402 
  Private information 143 343.49 202.59 100 875 
        
No change in private information All messages 242 317.34 212.52 100 1,060 
  Private information 4 245.75 101.19 110 350 
        
Increase in private information All messages 140 314.72 224.01 100 915 
  Private information 140 314.72 224.01 100 915 
        
Decrease in private information All messages 159 274.26 184.66 100 915 
  Private information 6 250.75 176.48 120 603 
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The regressions are conducted with Newey-West standard errors to get autocorrelation 
and heteroscedasticity robust estimates. All variables are checked for the presence of 
a unit root by performing several Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests. The results 
of the unit root tests with and without a trend suggest that all variables in the 
regressions are stationary (see Appendix Table C. 3). As a robustness check, we 
perform regressions with the first two lags of the dependent variable as further 
explanatory variables. 
5.6 Results 
Table 5-4 summarizes the OLS regression results of five models based on Equation 
(5.1) and including data from 2014 to 2016. The first column of Table 5-4 presents the 
outcome for the total sample. The coefficient of the variable Private information points 
to a positively significant impact on the intraday price. Holding all other variables 
constant, the intraday price increases by 1.21 €/MWh if the privately known missing 
capacities increase by 1000 MW. Furthermore, publicly known missing capacities 
have a positively significant impact on the intraday price, which is in line with 
Lazarczyk's (2016) empirical findings for the Nordic intraday market. These two 
results imply that the intraday price is partly affected by asymmetric information 
regarding unplanned power plant outages. However, from a legal perspective, there 
should not be any impact of private information about the actual outage on the intraday 
price at all. As Hagemann (2015b) expected, an increase in the forecast error of RES 
(i.e., excess supply) has a negative impact on the intraday price. In contrast, an increase 
in the load forecast error (i.e., an increase in electricity consumption) leads to a higher 
intraday price. The coefficient of the variable Net exports points to a positive impact 
on the intraday price as theoretically predicted.  
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Table 5-4: OLS regression results for the total sample and for the subsamples 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Total  
sample 
45 min  
lead time 
30 min  
lead time 
Total  
sample 
     
Private information 1.212* 0.563 2.127*** 0.563 
 (0.734) (1.305) (0.510) (1.353) 
Public information 1.053*** 1.188*** 1.222*** 1.188*** 
 (0.256) (0.385) (0.313) (0.397) 
     
RES forecast error -1.471*** -2.207*** -1.081*** -2.207*** 
 (0.218) (0.107) (0.259) (0.110) 
Load forecast error 0.264*** 0.268*** 0.408*** 0.268*** 
 (0.0530) (0.0625) (0.0886) (0.0628) 
Net exports 0.219** -0.141 0.510*** -0.141 
 (0.110) (0.181) (0.146) (0.189) 
     
Lead time change    -0.373 
    (0.864) 
Lead time change*Private information    1.564 
    (1.443) 
Lead time change*Public information    0.0342 
    (0.508) 
Lead time change*RES forecast error    1.126*** 
    (0.284) 
Lead time change*Load forecast error    0.140 
    (0.110) 
Lead time change*Net exports    0.652*** 
    (0.239) 
Dummies     
Hour Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant -0.0680 -0.211 -0.584 -0.211 
 (0.485) (0.521) (0.688) (0.557) 
     
Observations 25,697 13,097 12,600 25,697 
Adjusted R-squared 0.185 0.278 0.153 0.221 
Bandwidth 99 62 72 98 
Dependent variable: ID_price – DA_price. 
Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. 
Optimal Bandwidth for a Bartlett kernel was determined by the Newey-West method (Newey and 
West, 1994). 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
The second and third columns of Table 5-4 present the regression coefficients of the 
subsamples before and after the policy change, respectively. Both subsamples include 
nearly the same number of observations. In the old 45 min lead time regime, private 
information about missing capacities has a positive, but not statistically significant, 
impact on the intraday price (0.56 €/MWh). After the regime switch, however, the 
coefficient of the variable Private information points to a positively significant impact 
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of 2.13 €/MWh. Furthermore, the impact of the RES forecast error increases from  
–1.99 €/MWh to –1.08 €/MWh, the impact of the Load forecast error increases from 
0.27 €/MWh to 0.41 €/MWh and the impact of Net exports increases from  
–0.14 €/MWh (not statistically significant) to 0.51 €/MWh. The increases in the 
coefficients might be an indicator of enhanced market adoption due to the higher 
flexibility of the intraday market. 
To test the remarkable differences between both subsamples for statistical 
significance, we introduce a dummy variable for the lead time change that becomes 
one from July 16, 2015 onwards. Next, we multiply all explanatory variables with the 
policy change dummy and test these interaction terms for statistical significance. The 
fourth column of Table 5-4 summarizes the results. According to this test, only the 
increases in the coefficients RES forecast error and Net exports are statistically 
significant.  
Table 5-5 presents the regression results for the 30 min lead time subsample with 
detailed explanatory variables for private and public information. Holding everything 
constant, the coefficient of Private information increases from 0.56 €/MWh in the 
45 min regime to 1.80 €/MWh in the new regime (no change in private and public 
information due to the lead time reduction). This result might point to a higher 
adoption of the participants due to the increased flexibility on the intraday market. 
Furthermore, the coefficient of Private information is statistically significant for the 
content of market messages, which open the opportunity to trade with inside 
information.  
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Table 5-5: OLS regression results after lead time change 
 
 (1) (2) 
VARIABLES 30 min 
lead time 
30 min 
lead time 
   
Private information: total 2.127***  
 (0.510)  
Public information: total 1.222***  
 (0.313)  
   
No change in private and public information   
Private information  1.802*** 
  (0.665) 
Public information  1.709*** 
  (0.405) 
   
No change in private information   
Private information  -3.350 
  (4.927) 
Public information  0.208 
  (0.681) 
   
Increase in private information   
Private information  3.956*** 
  (1.054) 
Public information  -0.224 
  (1.934) 
   
Decrease in private information   
Private information  1.851 
  (1.792) 
Public information  0.315 
  (0.897) 
   
RES forecast error -1.081*** -1.076*** 
 (0.259) (0.258) 
Load forecast error 0.408*** 0.413*** 
 (0.0886) (0.0884) 
Net exports 0.510*** 0.512*** 
 (0.146) (0.147) 
   
Dummies   
Hours Yes Yes 
Day Yes Yes 
Month Yes Yes 
   
Constant -0.584 -0.467 
 (0.688) (0.705) 
   
Observations 12,600 12,600 
Adjusted R-squared 0.153 0.155 
Bandwidth 72 72 
Dependent variable: ID_price – DA_price. 
Newey-West standard errors in parentheses. 
Optimal Bandwidth for a Bartlett kernel was determined by the Newey-West method (Newey and 
West, 1994). 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5-6: Tests for differences between private and public information after lead time change 
      
Private = Public Total 
No change 
(private and public) 
No change 
(private) 
Increase 
(private) 
Decrease 
(private) 
F-statistic 2.85* 0.02 0.52 3.81** 0.58 
 
Period: 30 minutes lead time.  
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
To check whether private and public information have asymmetric impacts on the 
intraday price after the policy change, we test the differences between the estimated 
coefficients for statistical significance. Table 5-6 presents the results of these tests. 
While the difference in aggregated coefficients between private and public information 
(Total) is significant at the 10% level, the outcome changes on the disaggregated level. 
Only the difference in coefficients between the variables Private information and 
Public information is statistically significant when the lead time reduction creates 
constellations that open the opportunity to trade with private information. This result 
provides evidence for an asymmetric impact of both types of information on the 
intraday price. 
Appendix Table C. 1 and Table C. 2 present the regression results of the same models, 
but with the first two lags of the dependent variable as further explanatory variables. 
Our major finding is robust: private information regarding missing capacities has a 
positive significant impact on the intraday price, especially after the switch to a 30 min 
lead time regime, and its marginal impact is statistically different from the marginal 
impact of public information. 
5.7 Conclusion 
This paper investigates the impact of asymmetric information regarding unplanned 
power plant outages on intraday electricity prices in Germany from 2014 to 2016. In 
order to distinguish between private and public information, we split the content of 
100 
relevant market messages into periods before and after their publication and test 
whether this asymmetry affects the intraday price besides further market fundamentals. 
The results of an econometric analysis suggest that the intraday price increases, ceteris 
paribus, by 1.21 €/MWh if the privately known missing capacities increase by 
1000 MW. Similarly, public information regarding these missing capacities increase 
the intraday price by 1.05 €/MWh. 
We show that a reduction of the lead time and, therefore, increased flexibility on the 
intraday market indicate a higher adoption of the participants: on the one hand, the 
impact of forecast errors of RES on electricity prices is reduced, and cross-border 
trading becomes more relevant. On the other hand, the policy change enhances the 
possibilities of traders reacting to unplanned non-usabilities: an increase in the impact 
of private information on the electricity price is observed. Furthermore, the results 
suggest an asymmetric impact of private and public information on the intraday price 
after the lead time reduction on the power exchange.  
However, we have to acknowledge that the empirical findings in this paper provide 
indications for the impact of private information on intraday prices, but not evidence 
for actual insider trading. Since prices on the EPEX intraday market are determined 
through anonymous bids and offers, it is not possible to assign an abnormal trade in 
the data to a distinct market message (“smoking gun”). Nevertheless, policymakers 
could increase transparency among market participants and prevent information 
asymmetry by introducing a real-time updated market messages framework. 
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Appendix C 
Table C. 1: Robustness - OLS regression results for the total sample and for the subsamples 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Total  
sample 
45 min  
lead time 
30 min  
lead time 
30 min  
lead time 
     
ID_price_t-1 – DA_price_t-1 0.865*** 0.824*** 0.892*** 0.892*** 
 (0.0241) (0.0368) (0.0259) (0.0260) 
ID_price_t-2 – DA_price_t-2 -0.0733*** -0.0750*** -0.0784*** -0.0786*** 
 (0.0191) (0.0285) (0.0197) (0.0197) 
Private information 0.564*** 0.448 0.713***  
 (0.172) (0.307) (0.184)  
Public information 0.253*** 0.342*** 0.271***  
 (0.0483) (0.0775) (0.0642)  
     
No change in private and public information     
Private information    0.645*** 
    (0.211) 
Public information    0.373*** 
    (0.0805) 
No change in private information     
Private information    0.660 
    (2.029) 
Public information    0.0358 
    (0.190) 
Increase in private information     
Private information    1.109*** 
    (0.412) 
Public information    -0.0148 
    (0.337) 
Decrease in private information     
Private information    -1.274 
    (1.175) 
Public information    0.119 
    (0.222) 
     
RES forecast error -0.411*** -0.685*** -0.292*** -0.292*** 
 (0.0244) (0.0369) (0.0278) (0.0278) 
Load forecast error 0.0652*** 0.0804*** 0.0899*** 0.0914*** 
 (0.0101) (0.0137) (0.0177) (0.0178) 
Net exports 0.0812*** -0.0223 0.151*** 0.152*** 
 (0.0191) (0.0366) (0.0264) (0.0267) 
     
Dummies     
Hour Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Day Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Month Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Constant -0.245 -0.295 -0.374 -0.348 
 (0.162) (0.225) (0.232) (0.234) 
     
Observations 25,691 13,093 12,598 12,598 
Adjusted R-squared 0.733 0.725 0.750 0.751 
Dependent variable: ID_price – DA_price. 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table C. 2: Robustness - Tests for differences between private and public information 
      
Private = Public Total 
No change 
(private and public) 
No change 
(private) 
Increase 
(private) 
Decrease 
(private) 
F-statistic 5.23** 1.47 0.09 4.48** 1.36 
 
Period: 30 minutes lead time.  
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Table C. 3: Augmented Dickey-Fuller tests for unit root 
   
Variables ADF test statistic  ADF test statistic with trend 
ID_price – DA_price -17.695*** -17.695*** 
Private information -16.863*** -16.957*** 
Public information -14.668*** -14.691*** 
RES forecast error -11.898*** -11.898*** 
Load forecast error -10.592*** -10.907*** 
Net exports -6.638*** -6.879*** 
   
No change in private and public information   
Private information -11.701*** -11.788*** 
Public information -13.329*** -13.621*** 
   
No change in private information   
Private information -15.781*** -15.909*** 
Public information -14.553*** -14.673*** 
   
Increase in private information   
Private information -14.392*** -14.606*** 
Public information -14.615*** -14.618*** 
   
Decrease in private information   
Private information -16.707*** -16.711*** 
Public information -13.163*** -13.189*** 
 
Automatic lag selection: Schwarz information criterion. 
Significance levels: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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6 Outlook 
In writing three empirical papers, I gained deeper insights into the functioning of 
electricity spot markets and the role of regime changes on pricing. Consequently, the 
results of this dissertation could be useful from a policy perspective and may offer 
gateways for further research. 
The first study of this dissertation presents estimates for the price elasticity of demand 
in the EPEX day-ahead market using average hourly wind speed as an instrumental 
variable for the market price. The identification strategy is based on an institutional 
change from that of RES having to be traded exclusively on spot markets. It is argued 
that wind speed is a valid instrument after this change, but not before, when RES may 
have influenced the market price also from the demand side. The results suggest that 
the average price elasticity of demand in the EPEX day-ahead market is about –0.43 
in the period from 2010 to 2014, and the absolute value of the point estimates declined 
over time. One argument for why the price elasticity of demand was relatively high in 
the first years after the regime switch is that market participants may have needed time 
to adapt to the new institutional setting. 
One might argue that the empirical analysis of the price elasticity of demand focuses 
on the day-ahead market and not also on the futures and intraday market. In the years 
2013 and 2014, the volume traded at the day-ahead market represented around 46% of 
the total load in Germany. Hence, a relevant volume is traded at the spot market. If the 
spot market represented just a small part of all electricity trade, this might justify the 
use of load instead of traded volume. Lijesen (2007) provides two major arguments as 
to why it could make sense to estimate the elasticity of total demand with respect to 
the day-ahead market price. First, the approach would take into account the effects in 
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the spot market itself and the effects on the OTC contracts with prices linked to the 
day-ahead price. Second, it avoids the measurement problems related to distinguishing 
between demand and supply on the spot market.  
However, the first argument is only valid if the agreed-upon prices in OTC contracts 
are linked to the spot price. As Lijesen (2007, p. 254) pointed out, “contents of bilateral 
contracts are in general undisclosed information. Some of those contracts have fixed 
prices, others may be linked to the spot market price, either real-time or based on 
averages overtime.” Therefore, hourly spot prices may not necessarily have an 
immediate impact on the traded volumes outside the spot market, since many of the 
bilateral contracts might have fixed prices. The second argument provides support to 
the approach using traded volumes: it is argued that the instrumental variable wind 
speed allows dealing with the endogeneity problem. Using volumes traded on the day-
ahead market instead of load implies that the estimates do not represent the price 
elasticity of total electricity demand, but rather the price elasticity of demand in the 
day-ahead market. Future research might use the calculated elasticities to investigate 
market power in the German day-ahead market (Borenstein et al., 1999). 
The second study of this dissertation starts with an exact replication of original results 
based on the same data that were used in Viehmann's (2011) research. Replicating the 
results, the study confirms the presence of risk premia in the German day-ahead 
electricity market. While estimates of mean hourly risk premia can be replicated, the 
study does not reproduce respective Newey-West standard errors, leading to 
remarkable differences between significance levels reported in the original study and 
in the replication.  
Next, the empirical analysis is extended to previous years. The results of this analysis 
point to statistically significant risk premia that are more frequent during weekdays 
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than weekends. These results that are based on new data deviate from the findings 
Viehmann (2011) reported. In addition, they provide evidence that Bessembinder and 
Lemmon's (2002) reduced form of the model—a standard theoretical model in research 
on risk premia in electricity markets—might not accurately predict the risk premia in 
the German day-ahead market.  
This manuscript is the first empirical study that addresses the impact of negative prices 
on risk premia. Negative prices are a relatively new phenomenon in the European 
electricity markets, and in the future, they might become relevant in other electricity 
markets as well. The results suggest that the introduction of negative prices has led to 
a remarkable decrease in risk premia compared to the period of a positive price regime. 
While Viehmann (2011) conjectured that this might be the case, he was unable to 
empirically test this because his analysis was based on data with only positive prices. 
These new results also have implications for theoretical research because 
Bessembinder and Lemmon's (2002) model does not consider the existence of negative 
prices. Hence, the implementation of negative electricity prices in this model may be 
an interesting subject for future research. 
The third study of this dissertation investigates the impact of information regarding 
unplanned power plant outages on German intraday electricity prices. To distinguish 
between private and public information, the content of relevant market messages is 
divided into periods before and after their publication and tested to determine whether 
this asymmetry affects the intraday price. The results of an econometric analysis 
suggest that a reduction of the lead time enhances the possibilities of traders reacting 
to unplanned non-usabilities. Furthermore, the results point to an asymmetric impact 
of information about power plant outages on the average intraday price. Consequently, 
trading with private knowledge about these non-usabilities may distort electricity 
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prices, which is prohibited by the REMIT legislature. The difference in these impacts 
stems from the publication time lag of market messages. Depending on the time lag, 
the owner of private information may trade contracts on the intraday market without 
the public being informed. To avoid possible insider trades, policymakers could 
introduce a real-time updated market messages framework. This would eliminate the 
timely edge of power plant owners, and thus, only public knowledge about outages 
would impair the electricity prices, aside from market fundamentals.  
The evidence of asymmetric information about unplanned power plant outages is 
derived from aggregated price data of the EPEX continuous intraday market. Hence, 
the limitations of this study are as follows. The results present indications, but not 
evidence, for actual insider trading. Since bids and offers for intraday electricity 
contracts are determined anonymously, it is not possible to identify distinct trades as 
an immediate reaction to a power plant's non-availability. Another limitation is the 
restriction of private information to knowledge about power plant outages. Operators 
may manage a portfolio consisting of fossil-fueled power plants and RES. The feed-in 
of the latter is usually forecasted on the previous day and may be updated in a 
continuous manner. Thus, the possession of ongoing forecasts can also be interpreted 
as private information, since the public has only access to day-ahead forecasts. 
Consequently, it is assumed due to the lack of data that public forecasts of RES equal 
private forecasts of RES.  
In June 2017, the EPEX reduced the intraday lead time in Germany from 30 minutes 
to 5 minutes until delivery, but only if trades take place in the same control area of the 
TSO. It would be interesting to see whether the results of an asymmetric impact of 
private and public information remain robust after this regime switch. To this end, it 
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has to be assumed that missing capacities are traded in the respective control area of 
the power plant outage.  
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